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NOTE TO THE READER ON THE BOOK’S STRUCTURE 
This study contains three chapters. Chapter 1 presents an historical overview 
of the EU revenue system. It examines the context for setting revenue 
arrangements and the concept of EU ‘own resources’. This chapter further 
illustrates the implications of ‘budgetary balances’ calculations (i.e. the 
difference between member states’ contributions to the EU budget and 
payments received from it), conceptual weaknesses and an alternative way 
to assess economic benefits induced by EU expenditure. The burden-sharing 
for financing the EU budget is examined in detail in the last section, 
accompanied by figures and tables with reference to member states and on 
a per capita basis.  
Chapter 2 provides an assessment of the current system against 
simplicity, transparency, equity and democratic accountability. It examines 
the drawbacks of the proposals for reform put forward by the European 
Commission in 2011. It further discusses the potential for increasing public 
revenue represented by the significant amount of uncollected value-added 
tax (VAT). Finally, it sketches two possible options for reforming the EU 
revenue system, one ‘member state-centred’ and the other through a VAT-
based resource levied directly on citizens. 
The final chapter examines issues connected to EU revenue, such as the 
need to ensure its legitimacy through a demonstration of the added value of 
EU expenditure and a better rationale for setting the overall resources for the 
EU budget, on the basis of an assessment of the costs involved for achieving 
the intended results by each of the programmes. 
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PREFACE 
 he on-going review of the EU revenue system by a High-Level Group 
on Own Resources, formed in February 2014 under the chairmanship 
of the former Italian Prime Minister and European Commissioner 
Mario Monti, is the last in a series of efforts at reform. This system, which is 
mostly based on member states’ financial transfers, seems unalterable. Yet, 
it guarantees the resources needed to fund the around €140 billion spent each 
year by the EU budget. Why then change it?  
The need for reform is implicit in the four criteria set for the review: 
simplicity, transparency, equity and democratic accountability. The current 
system does not score well against any of these criteria. In particular, while 
the EU budget is financed from the cashbox of overall national taxation, this 
is not made visible to taxpayers. Citizens are therefore left in the dark. Out 
of sight, out of mind. 
The EU revenue system is an element of the legitimacy of the Union's 
action. In particular, the principles of transparency and taxation by consent 
would require making it possible for citizens to understand how the EU 
budget is financed and to ascertain what individual contributions they are 
making to fund it. 
Funding the EU budget with a visible resource, which would represent 
a major political decision with no practical possible reversal, is the ‘elephant 
in the room’ faced by the review. On the one hand, it would offer a way to 
bring Europe closer to its citizens, acknowledging the status of the EU as a 
union of member states and their nationals. On the other hand, it would 
imply making citizens directly liable for funding the EU budget, while EU 
revenue arrangements have traditionally been regarded as the game 
preserves of national chancelleries. 
Furthermore, raising awareness among EU citizens on their 
contribution to the EU budget will most likely stir up a volley of questions: 
What is the purpose of the EU budget? Who profits from it? On whom does 
the burden fall? Who is managing EU expenditure and who is ultimately 
accountable for the results? Thus, the visibility of EU revenue could prompt 
an unprecedented debate about the EU budget, and ultimately about the 
European integration process itself.  
T
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Should this possible line of questioning give EU policy-makers cause 
to be afraid to introduce visibility into the EU revenue process? The answer 
depends on how confident the EU institutions and member states feel that 
they can convincingly explain to EU citizens what the EU budget is for, what 
it has achieved so far and what it can further achieve in their interest and, 
finally, that all this is worth the cost. 
Gabriele Cipriani 
October 2014 
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Not everything that counts can be counted, 
 and not everything that can be counted counts. 
Albert Einstein 
 
 
1. THE EU BUDGET REVENUE SYSTEM 
he EU revenue system should be considered in the context of the 
highly innovative and evolutionary nature of the European Union, 
which is neither an international organisation nor a federal state. 
Originating from the decision by its member states to pool selected aspects 
of their respective sovereignties, the EU’s powers are founded on the 
principle of representation of interests.  
The EU framework is based on a dual legitimacy, which “brings 
together states and peoples via a unique form of political integration”,1 in a 
process of governance ‘without government’ organised around a single 
institutional framework. The European Union constitutes a new legal order 
of international law, the subjects of which comprise not only member states 
but also their nationals. 
The EU revenue system has been a subject of intense debate for years, 
in particular concerning the nature of the resources financing the EU budget. 
Many academicians have provided detailed reviews of the functioning and 
peculiarities of the system and have formulated a number of proposals to 
address its drawbacks. Still, the EU revenue system seems unalterable. In 
particular, no satisfactory solution has been found to make visible to citizens 
their contribution to the EU budget (some €140 billion in 2013, or an average 
of almost €280 per capita). 
EU revenue: A short history 
The evolution of the EU budget financing can be charted along the following 
timeline. 
                                                   
1 See European Commission, “A project for the European Union”, COM (2002) 247, 
Brussels, 22 May 2002, p. 20. 
T
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1952-1969. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC, 1951, 
Treaty of Paris) was entitled to procure the funds necessary to carry out its 
tasks by setting levies on the production of coal and steel, which might be 
defined as the first Community tax (Article 49 ECSC). By contrast, the Treaty 
of Rome (EEC, 1957) provided that the budget of the European Economic 
Community would be initially financed from member states’ contributions 
(Article 200 EEC), as shown in Table 1, with the option of replacing them by 
Community’s own resources at a later stage (Article 201 EEC). 
Member states’ contributions were based on a percentage scale 
provided for in the Treaty, differentiated according to the type of 
expenditure (administrative or operational). These scales were the result of 
a political agreement, although close to countries’ share in gross domestic 
product (GDP) at that time. The Council was entitled to modify the scales, 
by unanimous agreement. This happened notably in order to fund 
agricultural spending.  
Table 1. Share of the EEC budget financing by founding member states (%) 
Member states Administrative 
expenditure 
(%) 
Social Fund 
(%) 
Belgium 7.9 8.8 
Germany 28 32 
France 28 32 
Italy 28 20 
Luxembourg 0.2 0.2 
Netherlands 7.9 7 
 100 100 
Source: Article 200 of the EEC Treaty. 
1970-1984. In 1970, after long and difficult negotiations, member states 
agreed that “the Communities shall be allocated resources of their own” and 
that “from 1 January 1975 the budget of the Communities shall, irrespective 
of other revenue, be financed entirely from the Communities’ own 
resources”.2 As a result, from 1971, customs duties, agricultural duties, and 
                                                   
2 See Articles 1 and 4 of Council Decision 70/243/ECSC, EEC, Euratom of 21 April 
1970 on the replacement of financial contributions from member states by the 
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sugar and isoglucose levies (called ‘Traditional own resources’ or TOR) 
collected at EU entry were gradually transferred to the EU budget. In order 
to cover the administrative expenses for their collection, 10% of TOR was 
retained by the member states. Member states’ contributions from the value 
added tax (VAT)-based resource (1% of the taxable base) were made in full 
for the first time in 1980, covering around 50% of EU expenditure. 
1985-1987. The call-up rate for the VAT-based resource was increased 
from 1% to 1.4% and the principle was formalised that any member state 
bearing an excessive budgetary burden in relation to its relative prosperity 
may benefit at the appropriate time from a correction. A correction was 
granted to the United Kingdom (the UK rebate), in the form of a reduction 
of its VAT-based resource payments, to be financed by the other member 
states (with Germany paying two-thirds of its share). 
1988-1994. The principle of a multiannual financial framework (MFF) 
was introduced as a budgetary planning tool. Appropriations for payments 
were set by a global ceiling expressed as a percentage of member states’ total 
gross national product (GNP), increasing from 1.15% for 1988 to 1.20% for 
1992. A new resource was levied at a uniform rate in proportion to the GNP 
of each member state, as a measure of a country’s prosperity.3 The GNP-
based resource was also meant to function as a 'top-up' source of revenue to 
balance the budget, thus guaranteeing sufficient funding for the EU budget. 
In addition, while the maximum call-up rate for the VAT-based resource was 
maintained at 1.4%, member states’ VAT base was capped at a percentage 
(55%) of each national GNP. The reason invoked was to counter an alleged 
regressive effect of the VAT-based resource with relatively less well-off 
member states.4 
                                                   
Communities' own resources (OJ No L 94 of 28 April 1970, p. 19). Member states’ 
contributions for the transitional period until 31 December 1974 were fixed as 
follows: Belgium (6.8%), Germany (32.9%), France (32.6%), Italy (20.2%), 
Luxembourg (0.2%) and the Netherlands (7.3%). 
3 GNP results from adding to GDP the compensation of employees and the property 
income received from the rest of the world and by deducting the corresponding 
flows paid to the rest of the world. 
4 The percentage of capping of the VAT base does not result from any specific 
criteria. In particular, the size of the VAT base and therefore the effect of the capping 
is not proportional to member states' GNP/GNI. Gros & Micossi (2005:12) 
challenged the traditional view about a regressive effect of the VAT resource, by 
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1995-1999. The global own resources ceiling for payments was 
increased (from 1.21% for 1995 to 1.27% for 1999). There was also a 
progressive broadening of the capping of the VAT base (50% in 1999 for all 
member states) and a lowering of the call-up rate for the VAT-based resource 
(from 1.32% in 1995 to 1.0% in 1999). 
2000-2006. GNP was replaced by the concept of gross national income 
(GNI).5 The global own resources ceiling for payments was slightly 
decreased (from 1.07% of GNI for 2000 to 1.06% for 2006). The maximum call-
up rate for the VAT-based resource was reduced from 1% to 0.75% in 2002 
and 2003 and to 0.50% from 2004 onwards. Starting with the calculation of 
the UK rebate in 2001, Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden 
obtained to fund this rebate to a quarter of their normal share. As from 2001, 
the percentage of TOR that member states retain to cover collection costs was 
increased from 10% to 25%. 
2007-2013. The global own resources ceiling for payments was set at 
1.23% of GNI. The uniform rate of call of the VAT-based resource was 
reduced to 0.30%, although with some exceptions (for Austria it was fixed at 
0.225%, for Germany at 0.15% and for the Netherlands and Sweden at 0.10%). 
A gross annual reduction in their GNI contribution was granted to the 
Netherlands (€605 million) and Sweden (€150 million). 
2014-2020. While the global own resources ceiling for payments 
remains at 1.23% of GNI, the actual amount of payment appropriations has 
been lowered by almost 4% compared to the previous period. Reduced VAT-
based resource rates (0.15% rather than 0.30% for the other member states) 
are applied to Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. Moreover, Denmark, 
                                                   
observing that among countries with high VAT revenues one finds both rich 
(Sweden) and poor (Hungary); the same applies to countries with low VAT revenues 
in proportion to GDP (e.g. Spain, a Cohesion country, and Italy, with GDP per capita 
above the EU average). A factual analysis undertaken by the Commission in 2011 
came to similar conclusions. It shows in particular that the slight negative 
relationship between potential VAT revenues, expressed as a % of GNI, and the GNI 
per capita of the member states, seems not to be statistically significant and in some 
cases could be partly due to other factors (see European Commission, Financing the 
EU budget: Report on the operation of the own resources system, SEC (2011) 876 of 
27 October 2011, Brussels, p. 15 and p. 27). 
5 GNI equals GDP minus primary income payable by resident institutional units to 
non-resident institutional units plus primary income receivable by resident 
institutional units from the rest of the world.  
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the Netherlands and Sweden will benefit from reductions of their national 
GNI payments of €130 million, €695 million and €185 million, respectively. 
The Austrian annual GNI contribution will be reduced by €30 million in 
2014, €20 million in 2015 and €10 million in 2016. Finally, TOR collection 
costs retained by member states are reduced from 25% to 20%.6 
Figure 1 traces the evolution of the resources financing the EU budget 
since 1970.7  
Figure 1. The composition of EU revenue – Selected years (Outturn, %) 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration from European Commission – EU budget financial 
reports for 2007 and 2013, Luxembourg, 2008 and 2014. 
                                                   
6 See Council Decision of 26 May 2014 (2014/335/EU, Euratom) on the system of 
own resources of the European Union (OJ L 168 of 7 June 2014, p. 105). Its entering 
into force is subject to member states’ ratification, which is currently in progress.  
7 Other sources of revenue contribute to the EU budget financing, such as a tax on 
EU staff salaries and pensions, contributions from non-EU countries to certain EU 
programmes (e.g. EFTA countries in the research area), repayment of unused EU 
financial assistance, interest on late payments, fines imposed for breaches of EU law. 
In 2013, such revenue was close to €9 billion. It should also be noted that as the 
outturn of the previous exercise is normally a surplus (around €1.5 billion in 2011, 
and €1 billion in 2012 and 2013), member states’ contributions in the subsequent year 
are reduced correspondingly. 
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The figure shows that the pattern of revenue has undergone a 
profound modification over the years. This is principally due to the 
emergence of the GNP/GNI-based resource (74% of the own resources for 
the period 2007-2013) at the expense of the VAT-based resource, but also to 
the reduction of customs duties following the trade liberalisation and the 
increase of collection costs paid to member states as from 2001. Initially 
intended to complement the existing own resources, the GNP/GNI-based 
resource has become the dominant source of revenue as a conventional 
indicator of the contributive capacity of individual member states.  
What do ‘own resources’ actually mean? 
Following Article 3(6) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), “[t]he Union 
shall pursue its objectives by appropriate means commensurate with the 
competences which are conferred upon it in the Treaties”. Article 311 of the 
Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU) further clarifies that 
“[t]he Union shall provide itself with the means necessary to attain its 
objectives and carry through its policies. Without prejudice to other revenue, 
the budget shall be financed wholly from own resources”.8 
It should be noted that the EEC founding Treaty provided for the 
Community budget to be financed in a first phase through member states’ 
contributions (Article 200 EEC), with possibly moving on to the 
Community’s ‘own resources’ at a later stage (Article 201 EEC). Thus, the 
Treaty of Rome set a clear distinction between these two types of funding 
sources. This transition, ensured in principle by the decision of 21 April 1970 
“on the replacement of financial contributions from Member States by the 
Communities' own resources”, provided the political justification for giving 
the European Parliament budgetary powers.9 
As observed by Ehlermann (1982:572, 584-585), the exceptional 
procedure required for adopting such a decision (unanimity in Council plus 
ratification by national parliaments) was similar to that for introducing 
                                                   
8 It should be added that Article 323 TFEU provides: “The European Parliament, the 
Council and the Commission shall ensure that the financial means are made 
available to allow the Union to fulfil its legal obligations in respect of third parties.” 
9 While budgetary powers were previously vested in the Council alone, a gradual 
increase in the Parliament’s powers was endowed by the Treaties of 22 April 1970 
and of 22 July 1975. In particular, Parliament was given the last word on ‘not 
compulsory’ expenditure (see footnote 131), the power to adopt the budget and to 
grant discharge to the Commission for the budgetary implementation. 
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direct elections of the European Parliament (Article 138(3) EEC). This 
coincidence should be interpreted as the wish to make the EU financially 
independent from member states, just as direct elections of the European 
Parliament severed its ‘umbilical cord’ with national parliaments. Therefore, 
the purpose of these provisions would have been to disengage the 
Community progressively from the member states. 
The concept of ‘own resources’ was therefore meant to imply a shift of 
sovereignty on the part of member states, allowing the Community to exert 
a direct power of taxation over EU citizens. In this respect, Strasser (1991:91) 
defined ‘own resources’ as a tax borne directly by EU taxpayers which is 
included under revenue in the EU general budget and does not appear in the 
budgets of the member states.  
Yet, the idea that the EU is financed by resources that belong to it by 
right as a cornerstone of its financial autonomy, and that therefore revenue 
accrues automatically without the need for any subsequent decision by 
national authorities, needs to be put into context and its evolution considered 
over time. In particular, a key overarching element of the EU financing 
system is that EU expenditure is subject to strict predictability (‘budgetary 
discipline’), ensured through three main features: 
i. The overall volume of EU revenue is limited (since 1988) by an ‘own 
resources’ ceiling (for the MFF 2014-2020, payments shall not exceed 
1.23% of the EU GNI). This ceiling is updated every year on the basis 
of the latest forecasts in order to guarantee that the EU's total estimated 
level of payments does not exceed the maximum amount of own 
resources that the EU may raise during a given year.10 
ii. The EU budget is subject to the principle of equilibrium. This means in 
practice that to balance the budget each year, the revenue is 
determined in relation to the expenditure (and not the other way 
                                                   
10 Moreover, the overall amount of funds resulting from the application of the own 
resources ceiling has to be referred to GNI as estimated under ESA 95. The 2014-2020 
own resource decision (Council Decision of 26 May 2014, ‘Whereas’ 6 and Article 3, 
op. cit.) specifies that the entering into force of ESA 2010 (Regulation (EU) No 
549/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013, OJ L 174, 
26 June 2013, p. 1), which replaces ESA 95 (and will result, due mainly to the 
capitalisation of expenditure on R&D and weapon systems, in an increase of EU GNI 
of more than 2%), should however not raise the overall amounts agreed by the MFF.  
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round). Unlike its member states, the EU is not allowed to borrow to 
finance its activities or to cover any budget deficit.11 
iii. To ensure at the same time that EU spending is predictable, the MFF 
plays the role of a budgetary planning tool, laying down the maximum 
annual amounts ('ceilings') for broad categories of expenditure over a 
period of at least 5 years.12 
Therefore, as is often explained by the Commission, the EU budget 
cannot grow out of control. It never runs a deficit, never builds up debt and 
only spends what it receives. It is always balanced. 
Moreover, the EU does not have the power to raise taxes on its own. 
The type, the nature and the overall amount of the own resources as well as 
accessory specific arrangements are dealt with by a decision (the own 
resources decision) adopted unanimously by the Council, after consultation 
with the European Parliament.13 To enter into force, that decision requires 
further approval by each member state in accordance with its constitutional 
requirements, thus respecting national sovereignty. This implies in most 
cases a ratification by national parliaments; hence, the own resources 
decision constitutes a ‘Treaty’ within the Treaties. In practice, however, 
                                                   
11 See Article 310(1) TFEU and Article 17 of the Financial Regulation (EU, 
EURATOM) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
October 2012 (OJ No L 298 of 26 October 2012).  
12 The principle of an MFF is enshrined in the Treaties (Article 312 TFEU). The MFF 
Regulation is adopted by the Council (unanimously, although the possibility exists 
for the European Council to authorise its adoption by a qualified majority) in 
accordance with a special legislative procedure, on a proposal from the Commission 
and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. This means that 
Parliament can only adopt or reject the whole MFF, but has no genuine power of co-
decision. For the 2014-2020 MFF, see Council Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 
1311/2013 of 2 December 2013, laying down the multiannual financial framework 
for the years 2014-2020 (OJ No L 347 of 20 December 2013, p. 884). 
13 This procedure reflects the respective budgetary powers of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, as laid down by Article 314 TFEU. Paragraph 10 of 
this Article states: “Each institution shall exercise the powers conferred upon it 
under this Article in compliance with the Treaties and the acts adopted there under, 
with particular regard to the Union's own resources and the balance between 
revenue and expenditure.” However, Parliament’s consent is required concerning 
the adoption of implementing measures for the system of the Union's own resources, 
which, inter alia, define the assessment basis of the resources (see Article 311 TFEU).  
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national parliaments are under considerable pressure to give a green light to 
an agreement negotiated and approved by their own governments. A denial 
would re-open a negotiation with no guarantee of a more favourable 
outcome for the member states concerned. 
While the legal texts define all EU financing sources as ‘own resources’, 
only TOR revenue (13% of ‘own resources’ in the period 2007-2013) can be 
considered to be a ‘true’ EU financing source, since the EU is the legitimate 
institutional recipient of duties levied on a specific and identifiable taxable 
operation. Also, as there is often no coincidence between the place of 
collection and the final consumption of the goods, this revenue could not be 
attributed to a specific member state. 
By contrast, the assessment basis of the VAT and GNI-based resources 
(87% of ‘own resources’ in the period 2007-2013) derive from a member 
states’ calculation, mostly based on statistical data.14 These resources are 
therefore not ‘collected’ but put at the disposal of the EU budget as financial 
transfers from the cashbox of overall national taxation. In particular, the 
VAT-based resource is not levied directly on national taxable persons (and 
therefore on consumers), but on member states’ ‘notional’ harmonised VAT 
bases. In addition, due to the ‘capping mechanism’, the VAT-based resource 
has since 1988 become de facto a GNP/GNI-based resource for the countries 
                                                   
14 For the VAT-based resource, the establishment of each member state’s assessment 
base starts from the total net VAT revenue collected. The latter is divided by a 
‘weighted average rate’, meant to represent the statistical weighting of each VAT 
rate in the various categories of taxable goods and services subject to VAT. This 
intermediate base is finally adjusted with negative or positive compensations in 
order to obtain the final harmonised VAT base on which the EU call rate is applied 
(for the origin and evolution of the VAT-based resource, see Cipriani, 2007, pp. 46-
64). The GNI resource is obtained by the application of a rate determined within the 
budgetary procedure to the sum of all member states’ GNI forecasts. Member states 
are bound to establish the aggregate in a manner consistent with the European 
System of National and Regional Accounts (ESA), currently ESA 2010. The 
calculations underlying the assessment basis for these resources are complex and 
give room to numerous and often long-standing ‘reservations’ by the Commission. 
These reservations relate to the methods used by the member states for determining 
the national accounts or specific aspects of the calculation of the VAT base. At the 
end of 2013, there were 288 reservations awaiting solution concerning the GNI-based 
resource and 108 reservations concerning the VAT-based resource. 
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concerned. In 2014, five member states (Croatia, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta 
and Slovenia) will have their VAT bases capped at 50% of their GNI. 
Finally, member states’ contributions to the EU budget are recorded in 
national budgets in a diverse way. Only very few countries attribute 
contributions to the EU budget directly as appropriations to the EU and thus 
as a reduction in income of the central government (notably France, 
Germany, Austria and Romania). The majority considers the contributions 
to the EU budget as government expenditures. The exception is for TOR, and 
at times the VAT-based resource, but even there practices vary.15 
The discussion above shows that the ‘relay’ envisaged by the EEC 
Treaty between national contributions and ‘own resources’, with the latter 
meant to be a direct levy on citizens in view of making the EU financially 
independent, has not taken place. Member states have remained in the end 
the (pay)masters. Under the current circumstances, EU ‘financial autonomy’ 
means no more than member states’ complying with the obligation they have 
set on themselves to finance each year the EU budget within the limits of the 
MFF-agreed ceiling. 
To each its own 
In a speech to the European Parliament, 11 January 1977, Roy Jenkins, then 
President of the European Commission, observed: 
To wish to benefit from the success of the Community is a very good 
thing. But what is quite different, and indeed highly undesirable, is 
constantly to try to strike a narrow arithmetical balance as to exactly 
how much day-to-day profit or loss each country is getting out of the 
Community. (...) The Community can and must be more than the sum 
of its parts. It can create and give more than it receives, but only if the 
Member States, people and governments alike, have the vision to ask 
what they can contribute, and not just what they can get.16 
This statement provides good evidence of member states’ 
longstanding practice to calculate the benefits accrued from EU expenditure 
                                                   
15 See the study undertaken for the European Parliament’s Committee on Budgets, 
“How do members states handle contributions to the EU budget in their national 
budgets”, by Jørgen Mortensen, Jorge Núñez Ferrer and Federico Infelise, October 
2014, p. 42.  
16 See R. Jenkins, Speech to the European Parliament, 11 January 1977. 
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as the difference between their contributions to and the receipts from the EU 
budget (‘budgetary balances’).  
Figure 2 shows, for the period 2007-2013, the allocation of EU 
expenditure (total and by main spending areas) to the five main ‘net-payer’ 
member states (Germany, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands) as well as their ‘operating budgetary balances’.17 These 
member states fund together around two-thirds of national contributions to 
the EU budget. 
Figure 2. Allocation of EU expenditure and ‘operating budgetary balances’ – selected 
member states (outturn 2007-2013, € million) 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on European Commission, “EU Budget 2013 
Financial Report”, Luxembourg, 2014. 
                                                   
17 Member states’ ‘operating budgetary balances’ are calculated as the difference 
between their share in total ‘national contributions’ (VAT and GNI-based resources) 
paid to the EU and their share in the ‘operating’ expenditure (thus excluding 
Institutions’ administrative expenditure) allocated to EU countries, multiplied by 
the total amount of the latter. As a result, the sum of all member states’ balances 
adds up to zero. EU expenditure is allocated to the country in which the principal 
recipient resides, on the basis of the information available. Approximations and 
assumptions are sometimes necessary (for further details see http://ec.europa.eu/ 
budget/financialreport/annexes/annex3/index_en.html). The concept of 
budgetary balances draws a formal recognition since it is at the basis of the 
calculation of the UK rebate (see Article 4 of Council Decision of 26 May 2014, op. 
cit., COM (2014) 271 of 14 May 2014 and Council document 9823/14 of 15 May 2014). 
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Figure 2 shows that: 
 Over the 2007-13 period, France has been the major beneficiary of 
EU expenditure. This is due to the fact that this country accounts 
for a high share of EU total ‘agriculture markets’ expenditure 
(21%) and that this spending area represents a significant 
proportion of total expenditure (some 37% for the MFF 2007-2013). 
 As compared to other major member states like Germany, France 
and Italy, the United Kingdom has benefited from a lower amount 
of EU payments, overall and in general for the spending areas 
considered. Only for ‘Research’ spending does the United 
Kingdom record a relatively high position (in second place, 
behind Germany). 
 The share of the United Kingdom in ‘agriculture markets’ 
expenditure is well below that of Italy, France and Germany. This 
situation, one of the grounds at the basis of the UK rebate, suggests 
that as long as expenditure related to agriculture market and 
direct payments to farmers will represent some 30% of the EU 
budget operational expenditure (2014-2020 MFF), the UK will 
most likely feel legitimated to keep claiming an imbalance in its 
disfavour. 
It should be stressed that, as indicated by the Commission, the 
calculation of ’budgetary balances’ is merely an accounting exercise of 
certain financial costs and benefits. It gives no indication of many of the other 
benefits gained from EU policies contributing to the far-reaching Union’s 
objectives. The conventions that determine these calculations are ‘arbitrary’ 
and ‘highly questionable’.18 Yet, despite its conceptual weaknesses, 
‘budgetary balances’ calculations have emerged as the key benchmark for 
the MFF negotiation. In this context, ‘budgetary balances’ provide to each 
member state a measure for negotiating the MFF in view of reaching an 
outcome that is politically defensible at home and to monitor its 
implementation during the programming period. In fact, EU expenditure 
represents the financial ‘return’ of national contributions paid to the EU. This 
explains that a large part of this expenditure (agricultural market-related 
expenditure and direct payments to farmers, rural development, fisheries 
                                                   
18 See European Commission, SEC (2011) 876 of 27 October 2011, op. cit., p. 45. 
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and cohesion, representing some 70% of the 2014-2020 MFF) is directly or de 
facto pre-allocated on a country basis as part of the MFF deal.19 
The problem is not that member states try to assess the benefits they 
get from the EU budget, but rather that they are using the ‘wrong’ measuring 
instrument. ‘Budgetary balances’ calculations are a way of assigning 
importance to what can be measured rather than measuring what is 
important. As shown in a previous study, assessing the economic impact of 
EU expenditure would need a different approach.20 In this respect, it can be 
assumed that an EU payment triggers an increase in the demand of 
production of goods and/or services. This increased demand represents a 
meaningful proxy of the economic benefits generated by such payment. The 
increase in the demand of production will not be limited to the country 
where the beneficiary of the EU payment resides since, to be satisfied, the 
increase in the production will generate import flows from other countries 
(within/outside the EU). For example, EU funds disbursed to build a road 
investment in country X will trigger an increase of production also in the 
countries whose economic actors participate in the construction by 
providing workforce, materials and machinery.21 
                                                   
19 It is worth noting, however, that for the Environment and Climate Action – LIFE 
– programme (€3.5 billion during 2014-2020), national allocations will apply only to 
the sub-programme ‘Environment’ and until 2017. From 2018 onwards, national 
allocations are phased out and the selection of projects will be based on relative 
merits. 
20 See Cipriani & Pisani (2004).  
21 As discussed in a previous study (Cipriani, 2007, section on “Estimating the 
benefits, a facile solution”), funding structural expenditure in less well-off countries 
can generate a significant economic return for richer countries. For example, after 
their accession to the EU, the value of imports of the EU-10 from the EU-15 rose 
significantly. As a result, the negative trade balance of the EU-10 for the period 2004–
2006 was considerably higher compared with the period 2000–2003. It should also 
be noted that the value of EU funds for Cohesion and Rural Development allocated 
by the 2007-2013 MFF to the EU-10 member states represented around one-fifth of 
the value of imports of these countries from ‘net-payer’ countries (Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden and the United Kingdom) in the 
previous seven years. Finally, the economic impact of EU expenditure beyond the 
recipient countries is recognised at the national level (for example by the United 
Kingdom) and also outside the EU, by EFTA countries, which enjoy a privileged 
access to the internal market.  
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The geographical allocation of the ‘induced’ production generated by 
EU payments can be estimated using an input-output model (based on 
Eurostat data) showing the magnitude of the inter-industry flows in terms 
of the levels of production in each sector. The underlying assumption is that 
all economic productive activities can be divided into sectors whose 
interrelations can be meaningfully expressed in a set of simple input 
functions. 
An analysis of the economic impact of EU expenditure would therefore 
tell a different story than ‘budgetary balances’ calculations. While the latter 
imply that the accounting advantage of a member state comes at the expense 
of another member state, the economic reality would show a ‘win-win’ 
scenario as member states profit from EU expenditure, although to different 
degrees due to the diversity of the national industrial structures. 
Table 2. Comparison of net balances calculated according to ‘operating budgetary 
balances’ and ‘induced’ production demand (2000-2002) 
Member 
states 
Net balance (€ million) Ranking 
Operating 
budgetary 
balances 
Induced 
production 
demand 
Operating 
budgetary 
balances 
Induced 
production 
demand 
Difference 
(a) (b) (c)  (d) (e)  (f  = d – e) 
Belgium -299 1,364 7 8 -1 
Denmark -4 994 6 10 -4 
Germany -6,216 1,045 14 9 5 
Greece 4,149 6,747 2 3 -1 
Spain 7,504 17,552 1 1 0 
France -1,237 7,398 11 2 9 
Ireland 1,531 4,043 4 7 -3 
Italy -894 4,497 10 5 5 
Netherlands -1,874 -331 13 14 -1 
Austria -345 381 8 12 -4 
Portugal 2,253 5,574 3 4 -1 
Finland 75 889 5 11 -6 
Sweden -863 -228 9 13 -4 
UK -1,270 4,221 12 6 6 
Source: Cipriani & Pisani (2004). 
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Table 2 shows the final outcome of the exercise, through a comparison 
of two types of balances. The first balance (column b), in line with the 
traditional ’operating budgetary balances’ approach, has been calculated by 
subtracting member states’ payments to the EU budget (VAT and GNI-based 
resources) from EU payments received (‘operating budgetary balance’). The 
second balance (column c) has been obtained by subtracting member states’ 
payments to the EU budget (VAT and GNI-based resources) from the 
estimate of ‘induced’ production demand generated by EU payments.22 
Although the figures date back to the period 2000-2002, they provide an 
illustrative example of the differences that one may expect by using the two 
different approaches. 
Not surprisingly, this comparison shows very different results 
according to the two types of balances, which can be summarised as follows: 
 Countries appearing as ‘net’ contributors according to the ‘operating 
budgetary balances’ concept (for example, Belgium, Denmark, 
Germany, France, Italy, Austria and the United Kingdom) are in fact 
‘net’ beneficiaries when taking into account the ‘induced’ demand. 
 Mutatis mutandis, the same happens with countries that are 
traditionally ‘net’ beneficiaries like Spain. The value of the ‘real’ net 
balance for this country is more than two times higher than its 
‘budgetary’ balance. 
 The Netherlands and Sweden remain ‘net’ contributors in the two 
scenarios, although the deficit according to the ‘induced’ demand is 
rather limited compared to the one observed on the basis of ‘operating 
budgetary balances’. 
In order to highlight how each country changes its position in the 
hierarchy of ‘net contributors’, two rankings have been drawn up. The first 
is based on ‘operating budgetary balances’ (column d) and the second on the 
induced demand (column e). Both rankings are shown in descending order, 
placing in first place the country most advantaged and in 14th place the 
biggest ‘net contributor’. Compared to the ‘operating budgetary balances’ 
ranking, four countries improve their relative position if the induced 
demand is taken into account (see column f). In this way, France recovers 
                                                   
22 It should be stressed that the total amount of the estimated benefits, calculated 
following the methodology of the induced demand, is bigger than the EU 
expenditure (approximately +80%). This is due to the fact that the methodology 
considers not only the first productive cycle but also all subsequent iterations until 
the initial demand shock generated by EU payments is exhausted. 
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nine positions, the United Kingdom six, and Germany and Italy five each. 
Spain remains at the same level while all other member states would obtain 
a lower ranking. 
Independently of the degree of precision of the numerical results 
(which are highly dependent on the accuracy and the reliability of the 
available statistical data), it seems established that when evaluating the 
benefits accruing from EU expenditure, ‘budgetary balances’ calculations 
provide a very limited, and in a way misleading, assessment. 
An analysis of the economic impact of EU expenditure would also 
allow us to assess the likely ‘geographical’ effects of a possible different 
sectoral allocation of EU spending. Such an assessment could provide useful 
indications for addressing concerns of budgetary imbalances by some 
countries, in line with the 1984 Fontainebleau European Council Conclusions 
stressing that such imbalances should be ultimately addressed by means of 
expenditure policy.23 
The price of unanimity 
It is inherent to a revenue system based on ‘national contributions’ to be 
characterised by specific arrangements to reach the required member states’ 
unanimous consent. Although not provided for by the Treaties, corrective 
measures were introduced in the 1980s “to solve, it was hoped, problems 
related to budgetary imbalances”.24 The best known is the UK rebate, agreed 
in June 1984 (European Council of Fontainebleau). The rebate consists of 
reducing by two-thirds the balance between the United Kingdom’s 
contribution to the budget and EU payments to this country. The financial 
impact over time of the rebate is shown in Figure 3. 
                                                   
23 See the Conclusions of the Fontainebleau European Council, 25-26 June 1984, point 
1, and of the Berlin European Council, 24-25 March 1999, point 68. 
24 See European Commission,  SEC (2011) 876 of 27 October 2011, op. cit., p. 10. 
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Figure 3. The amounts of the UK correction, 1984-2011 (€ billion and % of GNI) 
 
Note: The amounts of the UK correction for 2008-2011 are provisional. 
Source: European Commission, “Financing the EU Budget: Report on the Operation of 
the Own Resources System”, Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC (2011) 876 of 27 
October 2011, p. 49. 
The UK rebate has opened the floodgates of member states’ claims to 
reduce their contributions on the basis of the same arguments, i.e. being too 
high compared to their relative wealth and the benefits they get out of the 
EU budget. These claims started with the financing of the UK rebate itself, as 
Germany was allowed to pay only two-thirds of its normal share, the balance 
being divided among the other member states. Later, also the Netherlands, 
Austria and Sweden have obtained a ‘rebate’ of their normal financing 
share.25 Other forms of correction have been introduced over time. For 
example, the capping of member states’ VAT bases at 50% of each national 
GNI, or the percentage of collection costs refunded to member states in 
                                                   
25 As a result, in 2014, only 9% of the cost of the UK rebate (estimated at €5.3 billion) 
is borne by Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden. Most of the bill will be 
paid by France and Italy (27% and 20%, respectively). A further 31% is funded by 
member states whose GNI per capita (PPS) is below the EU average. 
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return for collecting TOR.26 While these corrections have a permanent 
nature, other corrections have been agreed for the duration of a specific MFF. 
For example, as shown in section 1.1 on “EU revenue: A short history” for 
the MFF 2007-2013, the Netherlands and Sweden have benefited from gross 
reductions in their annual GNI contributions, and reduced VAT call rates 
were applied to Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden.  
The financial impact of most corrections applied during the 2007-2013 
MFF is provided in Table 3. 
Table 3. Impact of correction mechanisms granted to Germany, the Netherlands, 
Austria and Sweden (draft budget 2012, € million) 
Member 
state 
Impact of 
reduced VAT 
call rates 
Impact of 
lump sum 
GNI 
reduction 
Impact of 
reduced share in 
UK correction 
financing 
Combined 
impact 
Germany 1,143. 7 - 174 681.1 1,650.9 
Netherlands 437.7 638 160.4 1,236.1 
Austria 38.9 - 20 76.6 95.6 
Sweden 261.9 142 103.7 507.6 
                                                   
26 The percentage of collection costs refunded to member states is an automatic 
entitlement, unrelated to the actual costs incurred. As observed by the Commission, 
such a high percentage does not correspond to actual collection costs and can be 
considered a hidden correction mechanism to allow certain member states to 
decrease their payments to the EU budget (see Commission Staff Working Paper, 
SEC (2011) 876 of 27 October 2011, p. 12). The main beneficiaries of this measure are 
Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Between 2007 and 2013, they 
have retained 55% of all TOR collection costs (EU-27), or around €18 billion. In 2007, 
the Council requested the Commission to provide an assessment of the overall 
administrative costs for member states and the EU of the management, 
administration and control of the TOR system (see Council, Discharge to be given to 
the Commission in respect of the implementation of the budget for the financial year 
2005, Doc. 5710/07, Brussels, 7 February 2007). Such assessment has not been 
undertaken yet. It should be observed that a study carried out for the European 
Parliament has identified structural differences between member states’ 
performances in customs debt recovery (see Administrative performance differences 
between Member States recovering Traditional Own Resources of the European 
Union, 28 February 2013, PE 490.668 (www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/ 
etudes/etudes/join/2013/490668/IPOL-JOIN_ET(2013)490668_EN.pdf). 
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Note: The impact of these corrections on the UK correction calculation in 2013 is not 
included. 
Source: European Commission, “Financing the EU Budget: Report on the Operation of 
the Own Resources System”, Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC (2011) 876 of 27 
October 2011, p. 12. 
As shown by Table 4, subject to ratification of the own resources 
decision by member states, exceptions to the financing arrangements during 
2014-2020 will apply in one way or another to a number of member states (11 
in 2014). 
Table 4. Specific revenue arrangements applicable to some member states 
(2014-2020) 
Member state 
Capping of 
the VAT 
base to 50% 
of GNI 
(2014) 
Reduced 
call rate of 
the VAT-
based 
resource 
Reduced 
GNI 
contribution 
Rebates 
Reduced 
participation 
in bearing 
the cost of 
the UK 
rebate 
Denmark   x   
Germany  x   x 
Croatia x     
Cyprus x     
Luxembourg x     
Malta x     
Netherlands  x x  x 
Austria   x  x 
Slovenia x     
Sweden  x x  x 
United 
Kingdom 
   x  
Source: Author’s own elaboration from Council Decision of 26 May 2014 (2014/335/EU, 
Euratom) on the system of own resources of the European Union, OJ L 168 of 7 June 2014. 
Who pays how much? 
Expenditure foreseen by the 2014 EU budget amounts to €135.5 billion, or 
some 6% less compared to the 2013 budget. The own resources needed to 
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finance this expenditure account for 0.99% of the total EU GNI, so well below 
the ceiling (1.23%) currently in force. 
Table 5 below shows the share among member states of national 
contributions estimated for the 2014 budget.27 It may be noted that, in 
general, member states’ contributions slightly exceed their share in EU GNI. 
The United Kingdom represents an exception in this respect. This country 
contributes significantly less than its share in EU GNI (10.25% against a share 
in EU GNI of 14.53%). 
Table 5. Funding of the EU budget through national contributions (VAT and GNI-
based resources) in comparison to GNI (2014 budget, EU-28, €) 
Member states Total ‘National contributions'  (€) 
Share in total 
‘National 
contributions' (%) 
Share of EU 
GNI base (%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Belgium 3,719,173,706 3.16 2.96 
Bulgaria 395,635,841 0.34 0.31 
Czech Republic 1,343,409,442 1.14 1.06 
Denmark 2,432,887,956 2.07 1.96 
Germany 25,060,265,376 21.30 21.07 
Estonia 174,498,918 0.15 0.14 
Ireland 1,311,068,151 1.11 1.03 
Greece 1,655,378,187 1.41 1.34 
Spain 9,834,295,817 8.36 7.79 
France 20,296,355,175 17.25 16.00 
Croatia 419,114,443 0.36 0.33 
Italy 14,867,995,428 12.64 11.87 
Cyprus 147,770,830 0.13 0.11 
Latvia 225,500,402 0.19 0.18 
                                                   
27 It should be noted that own resources estimates for the 2014 budget have been 
established on the basis of the own resource decision in force (Council Decision 
2007/436/EC, Euratom, OJ L 163 of 23 June 2007, p. 17). Some retrospective 
adjustments in member states burden sharing would be needed once Council 
Decision of 26 May 2014, op. cit., currently undergoing ratification by member states, 
will enter into force. 
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Lithuania 326,724,598 0.28 0.26 
Luxembourg 325,642,134 0.28 0.25 
Hungary 909,695,924 0.77 0.72 
Malta 65,060,424 0.06 0.05 
Netherlands 5,507,526,997 4.68 4.65 
Austria 2,920,654,659 2.48 2.44 
Poland 3,748,526,667 3.19 2.92 
Portugal 1,533,546,309 1.30 1.20 
Romania 1,377,382,236 1.17 1.12 
Slovenia 333,933,232 0.28 0.26 
Slovakia 689,553,777 0.59 0.56 
Finland 1,955,620,734 1.66 1.53 
Sweden 4,011,378,248 3.41 3.37 
United Kingdom 12,060,889,112 10.25 14.53 
Total 117,649,484,723 100.- 100.- 
Source: Author’s own elaboration from General budget of the European Union for the 
financial year 2014 (Tables 5 – column 1 -, and 6 – columns 8 and 9), OJ L 51 of 20 February 
2014, pp. I/16 and I/17. 
A similar picture is provided when looking at the actual member 
states’ national contributions for the period 2007-2013. Table 6 confirms that 
in relation to GNI the situation of the United Kingdom is significantly 
different from that of the other member states. The average weight of this 
country in the EU GNI is 14.75%, whilst its contribution to the EU budget 
stands at 10.70%. It should also be noted, however, that to varying degrees 
Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden have also contributed 
proportionately less than their share in the EU GNI.  
  
22 | THE EU BUDGET REVENUE SYSTEM 
Table 6. Funding of the EU budget through national contributions (VAT and GNI-
based resources) in comparison to EU GNI (outturn 2007-2013, EU-27, €) 
Member states ‘National contributions’(€) 
Share in total 
‘National 
contributions’ (%) 
Share of EU 
GNI (%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Belgium 22,949,141,618 3.16 2.88 
Bulgaria 2,294,114,649 0.32 0.28 
Czech Republic 8,995,310,434 1.24 1.10 
Denmark 15,246,376,397 2.10 1.94 
Germany 144,350,028,759 19.90 20.72 
Estonia 1,001,211,841 0.14 0.12 
Ireland 9,204,749,638 1.27 1.13 
Greece 14,453,869,327 1.99 1.67 
Spain 66,343,188,432 9.15 8.22 
France 128,838,672,813 17.76 15.97 
Italy 98,474,506,654 13.57 12.38 
Cyprus 1,076,839,954 0.15 0.13 
Latvia 1,322,859,528 0.18 0.17 
Lithuania 1,907,016,535 0.26 0.24 
Luxembourg 1,899,610,206 0.26 0.23 
Hungary 5,859,788,801 0.81 0.74 
Malta 391,808,117 0.05 0.05 
Netherlands 27,396,559,320 3.78 4.69 
Austria 16,920,847,347 2.33 2.31 
Poland 22,249,236,981 3.07 2.73 
Portugal 10,812,179,731 1.49 1.31 
Romania 8,019,346,367 1.11 1.02 
Slovenia 2,302,709,527 0.32 0.28 
Slovakia 4,015,883,594 0.55 0.51 
Finland 11,994,581,814 1.65 1.48 
Sweden 19,464,224,118 2.68 2.96 
United Kingdom 77,655,247,244 10.70 14.75 
Total 725,439,909,748 100.00 100.00 
Source: Author’s own elaboration from European Commission, “EU budget 2013 
Financial report”, Luxembourg, 2014. 
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Figure 4 below presents the deviation of each member state from the 
EU-27 average of ‘national contributions’ in proportion to the GNI, as well 
as in relation to the population (per capita contribution). The point ‘0’ in the 
figure represents the EU average, based on cumulative data for the period 
2007-2013. EU average values are respectively 0.83% of the EU GNI and 
€1,453. The analysis shows that for a large majority (23) of EU-27 member 
states the actual contribution in percentage of GNI was above the EU 
average. This is the result of the correction mechanisms discussed earlier. 
Figure 4. Contribution to EU budget as a % of GNI and per capita 
(nominal value, €) - Deviation from EU-27 average (outturn 2007-2013) 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration from Eurostat data (2010 Population) and European 
Commission,  “2013 Financial Report”, Luxembourg, 2014. 
More in detail, Figure 4 shows that member states could be divided 
basically into four categories: 
i. Countries whose contribution is below average for both the GNI ratio 
and the per capita contribution. The United Kingdom is the only 
member state in such a situation (0.60% of its GNI and €1,242 of per 
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above average in terms of per capita contribution. This is the case of 
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Germany (0.79% of its GNI and €1,765 of per capita contribution), 
Sweden (0.75% of its GNI and €2,084 of per capita contribution) and 
the Netherlands (0.67% of its GNI and €1,653 of per capita 
contribution). 
iii. Those whose contribution is above average for both the GNI ratio and 
the per capita contribution. Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland, Belgium, 
Ireland, Austria, France and Italy meet these conditions. 
iv. Those whose contribution is above average for the GNI ratio but below 
average in terms of per capita contribution. This is the case of Spain, 
Greece and Portugal as well as of the member states having joined the 
Union after May 2004. 
Table 7 compares GNI and national contributions to the EU budget for 
a number of member states and on a per capita basis. Both values are 
expressed in purchasing power standard – PPS at market prices. 
Table 7. Average GNI and national contributions (VAT and GNI-based resources) 
per capita (PPS, outturn 2007-2013, €) – Selected member states 
Member state 
GNI 
(PPS) 
per 
capita 
EU-27 
average=100 
Member state 
ranking 
EU-27 average 
Nat’n 
contri-
butions 
per 
capita 
(PPS) 
EU-27 
average=100 
% of 
(6)/(2) 
GNI 
Nat’n 
contri-
butions 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Luxembourg 46,967 187.8 1 1 3,133 216.2 6.67 
Netherlands 32,257 129.0 2 12 1,507 104.0 4.67 
Denmark 31,800 127.1 3 2 2,001 138.1 6.29 
Sweden 31,729 126.8 4 9 1,669 115.2 5.26 
Austria 31,357 125.4 5 5 1,834 126.6 5.85 
Germany 30,371 121.4 6 8 1,690 116.6 5.56 
Belgium 29,657 118.6 7 3 1,889 130.4 6.37 
Finland 28,886 115.5 8 4 1,866 128.8 6.46 
United 
Kingdom 27,471 109.8 9 13 1,155 79.7 4.21 
Ireland 27,450 109.7 10 6 1,780 122.9 6.49 
France 27,429 109.7 11 7 1,768 122.0 6.45 
Italy 25,271 101.0 12 10 1,606 110.8 6.35 
Spain 24,343 97.3 13 11 1,569 108.3 6.45 
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Note: The conversion in PPS of national contributions has been obtained by applying the ratio 
GNI in €/GNI in PPS. 
Source: Author’s own elaboration from Eurostat data (2010 Population; GNI in PPS – Average 
2007-2013, 2007-2012 for Ireland, Greece, Luxembourg, Hungary, Poland and Romania) and 
European Commission, “2013 Financial report”, Luxembourg, 2014. 
The following conclusions can be drawn on the basis of Table 7: 
 As already shown by Figure 4, the United Kingdom is the only member 
state whose per capita contribution to the EU budget is (far) below the 
EU-27 average. 
 The ratio ‘national contributions’ per capita (column 6) over GNI per 
capita (column 2) shows that the share of citizens’ wealth allocated to 
the EU budget is both limited and quite different depending on the 
member state (see column 8). This share is the lowest in the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands. Sweden, Germany and Austria are also 
below the arithmetical average of the member states considered 
(5.93%). 
 There is no correlation between member states’ GNI per capita and the 
EU budget financing. For example, Denmark and Sweden have 
practically the same value of GNI-PPS per capita but their per capita 
contribution to the EU budget is quite different. The same applies to 
the United Kingdom as compared to Ireland or France. 
 When looking at the ranking of countries in relation to the EU-27 
average (columns 4 and 5), one can observe that the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom are far higher in the GNI ranking 
when compared to their position based on the national contributions 
paid. The opposite is true for Belgium, Finland, Ireland and France.  
 
Figure 5 below shows, for the net payer member states, the value of 
their negative balance in percentage of the GNI. This confirms that this 
balance represents a rather low share of the GNI, in particular for the United 
Kingdom. 
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Figure 5. ‘Operating budgetary balances’ as a % of GNI – Net-payer member states 
(outturn 2007-2013) 
 
Source: Author’s own elaboration based on European Commission, “EU Budget 2013 
Financial Report”, Luxembourg, 2014. 
Concluding remarks 
The ‘relay’ envisaged by the EEC Treaty between national contributions and 
‘own resources’, or between member states’ transfers and a direct fiscal levy 
on citizens making the EU financially independent, has not taken place. EU 
‘financial autonomy’ means no more than member states complying with the 
obligation they have set for themselves to finance the EU budget each year 
within the limits of the MFF agreed ceiling. EU revenue arrangements still 
require approval by national parliaments, despite an elected European 
Parliament as the institutional place where “[c]itizens are directly 
represented at Union level”.28 
EU revenue is traditionally a matter restricted to intergovernmental 
negotiation, whereby revenue and expenditure go hand in hand. This 
explains that most of EU expenditure is pre-allocated on a geographical 
basis, as it represents the financial ‘return’ of national contributions paid to 
the EU. The rationale of EU revenue arrangements, funded out of the 
cashbox of the overall taxation, is nothing else than finding for each member 
                                                   
28 See Article 10(2) TEU. 
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state an acceptable balance between their contributions and EU payments to 
them. Hence, the number of corrections for several member states to reach 
the required unanimous agreement. An analysis of these contributions 
shows that there are significant discrepancies among member states in 
comparison to a macroeconomic aggregate like GNI or on a per capita basis. 
Against this background, EU citizens are generally unaware that they 
contribute to the EU budget and by how much. 
The concept of net balances between contributions and EU payments 
has become the master of the EU financial arrangements. Yet, the 
conventions that determine these calculations, criticised by the Commission 
as ‘arbitrary’ and ‘highly questionable’ and for encouraging a narrow-sided 
geographical distribution of EU expenditure, provide only a simplistic view 
of member states’ benefits and their trend. In fact, due to the spillover effects 
of EU expenditure beyond the borders, member states claiming an imbalance 
on the basis of ‘budgetary balances’ calculations may actually appear as net 
beneficiaries. In this respect, a measure of the impact of EU expenditure in 
economic terms (increase in the production of goods and services) would 
show completely different results than ‘budgetary balances’ calculations.  
Given that assessing the benefits of EU expenditure is a legitimate 
ambition, it would seem appropriate for the Commission to develop 
alternative and more meaningful methods than ‘budgetary balances’ 
calculations. In line with the idea of a budget for ‘Europeans’ and the 
consequent need to establish a direct link between citizens and the EU 
budget, the benefits of EU expenditure should be assessed with reference to 
EU citizens, and not just to member states. The mid-term review/revision of 
the MFF to be undertaken by the end of 2016 provides an opportunity to 
assess the implications of EU expenditure in creating budgetary imbalances. 
This exercise may also start a discussion on the criteria that could potentially 
be used to ascertain the existence of a member state’s budgetary imbalance. 
  
 
| 29 
What is simple is usually not easy. 
Jean Monnet 
 
 
2. SIMPLICITY, TRANSPARENCY, EQUITY 
AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 
ollowing the recent agreement on the 2014-2020 multiannual financial 
framework, the European Parliament, Council and the European 
Commission agreed to set up a High-Level Group on Own Resources 
chaired by former Italian Prime Minister and European Commissioner 
Mario Monti, to carry out a general review of the own resources system. The 
High-Level Group will provide a first assessment by the end of 2014. 
Progress of the work will be examined at the political level in regular 
meetings, at least once every six months. National Parliaments will be 
invited to an inter-institutional conference during 2016 to examine the 
outcome of this work. On this basis, the Commission will assess if new 
initiatives are appropriate. This assessment will be completed by the end of 
2016 at the latest, in parallel with the review of the functioning of the MFF, 
with a view to possible reforms to be considered for the period covered by 
the next multiannual financial framework. 
Commenting on the first meeting of the High-Level Group in early 
April 2014, the former EU Budget Commissioner Janusz Lewandowski 
stated: 
Everybody agrees that the current system is too opaque, too 
complex and, let's be frank, outdated. However, unanimous 
agreement on the need to improve the current system is one thing, 
finding a fairer, more transparent and more modern system likely 
to be agreed by all is another thing.29 
                                                   
29 See “Towards a better, fairer and simpler funding of the EU budget”, statement 
by Commissioner Janusz Lewandowski after the first meeting of the High level 
Group on Own Resources, 4 April 2014 (http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-
2014/lewandowski/headlines/index_en.htm?id=201400001200&type=news). 
F
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Indeed, the debate about the EU revenue system is an issue dating back 
to the EEC Rome Treaty of 1957, which opened the prospect of replacing 
member states’ national contributions by ‘Community’s own resources’.30 
Like the Phoenix, a review of the EU revenue system rises up at regular 
intervals. The adoption of each MFF since 1988 has been accompanied by a 
request to review the EU revenue system. So far, all attempts at reform have 
failed, in particular the introduction of forms of direct EU fiscal revenue.  
In fact, not all stakeholders (Parliament, Council or the Commission) 
share a true motivation for change. The Council’s main concern is to avoid 
any risk of a ‘supranational’ drift that might eventually lead member states 
to lose their current tutelage over EU financing arrangements. As shown by 
the transformation of the VAT-based resource into a national contribution, 
member states are traditionally reluctant to accept any form of direct fiscal 
taxation and financial autonomy for the EU. They have already indicated 
that pursuit of financial autonomy should not undermine equity, 
transparency, cost-effectiveness and simplicity.31 And it is certainly no 
accident that the Council has omitted in the own resource decision 
applicable to the MFF 2014-2020 to indicate, as proposed by the Commission, 
that the own resources system “should, as far as possible rely on 
                                                   
30 See Article 201 EEC. As early as 1965, the Commission proposed a global package 
of measures aimed at establishing a link between financing the CAP, raising 
independent revenue for the Community and giving wider budgetary powers to the 
European Parliament. Not only did the Commission envisage a gradual transfer (as 
of July 1967) of the customs duties and agricultural levies to the EU budget, it also 
suggested amending Article 201 EEC providing that the Council should consult the 
European Parliament concerning the replacement of national contributions by ‘own 
resources’. Also, the approval of EU revenue arrangements by national parliaments 
should have been discontinued once the European Parliament was directly elected 
(see European Commission, “Financement de la politique agricole commune – 
Ressources propres de la Communauté – Renforcement des pouvoirs du Parlement 
européen”, COM (65) 150, Brussels, 31 March 1965). It must be remembered that the 
proposed arrangements for financing agricultural spending were notably at the 
source of a serious crisis of the Community, the ‘empty chair crisis’ with France 
boycotting Council meetings as from July 1965. This crisis was resolved with the 
Luxembourg compromise (January 1966), providing that "when vital interests of one 
or more countries are at stake, members of the Council will endeavour to reach 
solutions that can be adopted by all while respecting their mutual interests". 
31 See European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Berlin European Council of 
24-25 March 1999, point 67.  
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autonomous own resources in the spirit of the Treaty, rather than on 
financial contributions from Member States which they widely perceive as 
national expenditures”.32 
Similarly, the Commission has little reason to feel rushed. There is no 
fire in the house. The agreed resources are secured from the outset and are 
paid out without major problems. The best guarantee in this respect is that 
some 90% of these resources are handed back to member states in the form 
of EU expenditure. 
Only Parliament, which in an initial stage made conditional its 
approval of the 2014-2020 MFF to a reform of EU revenue, has a real interest 
in moving forward.33 Not just as an advocate of EU citizens’ interests but, 
more importantly, in view of possibly extending its prerogatives to the 
revenue side of the budget, after having obtained with the Treaty of Lisbon 
a broad co-decision framework for approving the spending programmes 
and the annual budget, where Parliament is now at an equal level with the 
Council. In the end, the objective for Parliament could be to establish a 
parallelism of powers between revenue and expenditure arrangements. 
Since any agreement has to be endorsed unanimously by all member 
states, a confirmation of the status quo remains a serious possibility. The 
objective ‘ally’ of such scenario is that the current revenue system allows a 
stable flow of resources, in line with the MFF agreement. Some may actually 
consider that the current debate is a kind of distraction or, at most, that 
redesigning the way the EU gets its revenue is not a top priority.34 
Indeed, why change a system that has guaranteed a relatively smooth 
financing of the EU budget? 
                                                   
32 See European Commission, Amended proposal for a Council Decision on the 
system of own resources of the European Union, Recital No 4, COM (2011) 739, 
Brussels, 9 November 2011. 
33 See European Parliament Resolutions of 13 June 2012 on the Multiannual Financial 
Framework and own resources (paragraph 3) and of 23 October 2012 in the interests 
of achieving a positive outcome of the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020 
approval procedure (paragraph 73). 
34 See speech by H. Van Rompuy, “A Curtain went up”, 9 November 2010, doc. PCE 
256/10 
(www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/117623.pdf). 
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Four good reasons for change 
The reasons for change have been provided by the MFF 2014-2020 agreement 
itself, by stating that the general review of the own resources system should 
be guided by four main criteria: simplicity, transparency, equity and 
democratic accountability.35 
More particularly, concerning simplicity, the current system takes 
advantage of the fact that a revenue collection system is only needed for TOR 
(Traditional own resources). VAT and GNI-based resources are not 
‘collected’ but just put at the disposal of the EU as financial transfers from 
national budgets. So, all in all, the current system can be considered as cost-
effective if compared to a traditional fiscal collection system. Still, the 
calculations (and control) for both the VAT and GNI-based resources are 
complex. Member states’ contributions for a given year only become final 
after several years and are not free from a significant number of difficulties.36 
Moreover, the co-existence of two types of ‘national contributions’ serves no 
other purpose than justifying a different burden-sharing among member 
states. Not least, the calculation of the UK rebate is another complex exercise, 
which is not exempt from errors.37 
Nor does the EU revenue system score well in terms of its transparency 
and democratic accountability. The nature of a transfer from national 
budgets of most resources and the proliferation over time of ad-hoc 
corrections for some member states have led to opacity of the system. The 
famous ‘no taxation without representation’ principle is applied at EU level 
the other way round. There is representation (namely through the European 
                                                   
35 See Joint Declaration on Own Resources by Parliament, Council and Commission, 
Council document 15997/13, ADD 1, point 4, Brussels, 25 November 2013. It should 
be noted that in its conclusions of 7 and 8 February 2013, the European Council 
limited these criteria to simplicity, transparency and equity, thus omitting 
democratic accountability (see European Council Conclusions of 7 and 8 February 
2013, doc. EUCO 37/13, Brussels, 8 February 2013, point 111). The same omission 
can be observed in Recital 3 of Council Decision of 26 May 2014, op. cit. 
36 See footnote 14.  
37 For example, the European Court of Auditors has found that the Commission’s 
calculation of the 2006 definitive amount of this correction resulted in an excessive 
correction granted to the United Kingdom of €189 million, or 3.5% of the UK rebate 
for 2006 (see European Court of Auditors, Annual Report concerning the financial 
year 2010, paragraph 2.16 and annex 2.5, point 7). 
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Parliament), but no visible and explicit taxation for the EU budget. This 
makes EU revenue impalpable to the general public, undermining citizens’ 
awareness. Citizens are generally unaware that by paying for example 
income tax, or any other tax, they may also contribute to financing the EU 
budget. The European Parliament considers that there is a crucial need for a 
democratic reform of EU resources because the current system is not subject 
to parliamentary control at either European or national level, thus violating, 
in essence, “the letter and spirit of the Treaty”.38 
Since the EU budget is currently designed to be financed by member 
states (and not directly by citizens), the equity of the system is usually 
assessed by reference to the GNI, which is traditionally considered the best 
indicator of a member state’s ability to contribute (i.e. proportionality of 
gross contributions to income across the member states). This explains the 
current overwhelming weight of the GNI-based resource. According to the 
Commission, “no own resource can be more equitable”. Along the same 
lines, the European Parliament has indicated that the GNI resource is 
“equitable in relating contributions to the general level of prosperity of 
Member States”.39 
Indeed, the rationale of introducing the GNP (later GNI) resource in 
1988 was precisely that the more national contributions would be 
proportional to GNP, the more equity would have been achieved, since the 
GNP was supposed to measure the prosperity of a country (through its 
national income) and not, like the GDP, its productive capacity. 
However, as shown previously in section 1.5, “Who pays how much?”, 
there is not necessarily a correlation between member states’ GNI and their 
share in the EU budget financing. It is in particular the UK rebate that upsets 
the correlation with the ability to pay. So, ‘horizontal equity’, in the sense 
that the burden should be shared among member states according to an 
equal ability to contribute, is not fully respected. This undermines the 
neutrality of the revenue system. The European Parliament has observed 
                                                   
38 See European Parliament, Resolution of 23 October 2012, op. cit., paragraph 71. 
See also European Parliament, Resolution of 8 June 2011 on Investing in the future: 
a new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for a competitive, sustainable and 
inclusive Europe, paragraph 169.  
39 See European Commission, “Financing the European Union”, COM (1998) 560, 
Brussels, 7 October 1998, p. 11 and European Parliament, Resolution of 29 March 
2007 on the future of the European Union's own resources, paragraph 23. 
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that the nature of EU resources and the derogation regimes progressively 
added have made the EU revenue system “increasingly less equitable and 
have led to a financing system which has resulted in unacceptable 
inequalities between Member States”.40 
Concerning ‘vertical equity’, referring to distribution of income among 
citizens, a serious threat is represented by the fact that the level of real 
income is not equal among the member states. Yet, there is no progressivity 
in contributions to take account of how well off are the citizens of a country 
or a region compared to the EU average (relative prosperity). In this respect, 
as shown by Figure 4 and Table 7, the financial burden on a per capita basis 
is significantly different among EU citizens. One might note, however, that 
in the EU budget context ‘progressivity’ is meant to be addressed through 
‘solidarity’, notably by allocating Cohesion funding to less well-off regions. 
It should also be observed that the use of GNI for key features of EU 
revenue (setting of the own resources ceiling, establishment of the GNI-
based resource, calculation of the weighted-average rate of the VAT-based 
resource and capping of its assessment basis) requires that statistical data 
should not only be reliable and exhaustive, but they should also allow a 
comparison of ‘apples’ with ‘apples’ across member states. The more so as 
GNI is part of European statistics that underlie important decisions for the 
economic governance of the EU, in particular to determine European fiscal, 
macroeconomic and monetary policies. Therefore, GNI also plays a role in 
building citizens’ trust in European statistics.41 
As the chief provider of European statistics, Eurostat has the 
challenging role of ensuring that the “production of Union statistics shall 
conform to impartiality, reliability, objectivity, scientific independence, cost-
effectiveness and statistical confidentiality” (see Article 338(2) TFEU). The 
number of pending (and sometimes longstanding) issues related to member 
states’ GNI calculations shows that national statistical processes may not 
always guarantee that economic activities are estimated in accordance with 
the European System of Accounts.42 Despite all efforts to ensure the best 
                                                   
40 See European Parliament, Resolution of 8 June 2005 on Policy Challenges and 
Budgetary Means of the Enlarged Union 2007–2013, paragraph L. 
41 It should be noted that Europeans' opinions on the trustworthiness of the official 
statistics are split, with a slight majority tending not to trust them. See Special 
Eurobarometer 323, “Europeans’ knowledge of economic indicators”, January 2010, 
p. 44 (http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_323_en.pdf). 
42 See footnote 14. 
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accuracy possible, GNI remains by its own nature an aggregation of 
estimates, based on concepts, methods and sources of data whose 
harmonisation in practice cannot be absolute. In this respect, one key issue 
is the reliability and comparability across countries of the estimate of the 
‘underground economy’. Since, by definition, the latter cannot be measured 
directly, an adequate assessment of this estimate would require full 
transparency on the methods and sources used by the statistical offices. Yet, 
this is not available in all EU countries. 
The European Court of Auditors has observed that considerable efforts 
have been made since 2005 to enhance the European statistical system. 
However, the move towards a better quality framework for European 
statistics is slow, is yet incomplete and remains a challenge for all those 
involved. The European Statistics Code of Practice sets demanding 
standards, but it has only been partly implemented and lacks strong 
verification and enforcement tools. The Court also reported weaknesses 
concerning Eurostat’s risk assessment relating to member states’ compilation 
of national accounts, the application of a consistent approach when carrying 
out its verification procedures in the member states, the performance of 
sufficient work at that level and adequate reporting thereupon.43 
The drawbacks of the 2011 Commission’s proposals 
According to the Commission, the current EU revenue system “performs 
poorly with regard to most assessment criteria”. It “is opaque and complex. 
This limits democratic oversight of the system”. It is “almost impossible for 
EU citizens to ascertain who effectively bears the cost of financing the EU”. 
Many member states “perceive the system to be unfair. More importantly 
perhaps, the way the EU budget is financed creates a tension which poisons 
every debate about the EU budget”. This “contributes to an increasing focus 
Member States place on a narrow ‘accounting’ approach with the main 
objective of maximising financial returns from the EU budget”. In short, “EU 
financing has primarily been treated as an accounting mechanism with two 
                                                   
43 See European Court of Auditors, Special Report No. 12/2012, “Did the 
Commission and Eurostat improve the process for producing reliable and credible 
European statistics?” Luxembourg, 2012, pp. 107-108 and Special Report No. 
11/2013, “Getting the Gross National Income (GNI) data right: A more structured 
and better-focused approach would improve the effectiveness of the Commission’s 
verification”, Luxembourg, 2013, pp. 95-97. 
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main objectives: ensuring sufficient financing of EU expenditures and 
incorporating the increasing number of correcting mechanisms”. Finally, 
with the exception of customs duties, “the EU resources currently display 
almost no link to – nor do they support – EU policy objectives”.44 
Against this background, the Commission has put forward, alongside 
its proposal of MFF 2014-2020, a reform of the own resources system in view 
of its introduction on 1 January 2014.45 This reform, which was eventually 
not adopted by the Council, had three main objectives: i) the simplification 
of member states’ contributions, ii) the introduction of new own resources 
and iii) the reduction of existing contributions from member states. 
The objective of simplification was principally sought through two 
main measures: 
 First, the abolition of the current VAT-based own resource, which is 
considered complex and requiring much administrative work to arrive 
at a harmonised base; it is also a source of the opacity of member states' 
contributions to the budget while offering little or no added value 
compared to the GNI-based own resource. 
 Secondly, the introduction of lump-sum reductions in the GNI-based 
resource payments to replace the sometimes complex correction 
mechanisms (above all, the UK rebate) dealing with the budgetary 
burdens that some member states consider excessive when compared 
to their relative prosperity. 
As a consequence of the incorporation of all corrections into lump 
sums, the Commission also proposed to reduce the TOR collection costs 
retained by the member states from 25% to 10%. 
The proposal of introducing new own resources has been based on the 
assessment of six potential candidates and their variants (financial sector 
taxation; revenue from auctioning under the EU Emissions Trading System; 
taxation of the aviation sector; an EU VAT; an EU energy tax and an EU 
corporate income tax). The Commission concluded in favour of a new VAT 
own resource and a resource based on a financial transaction tax (FTT) in 
view of reducing member states' contributions to the EU budget. 
                                                   
44 See European Commission,  SEC (2011) 876 of 27 October 2011, op. cit., p. 3, 4 and 
19.  
45 See European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision on the system of own 
resources of the European Union, COM (2011) 510, Brussels, 29 June 2011. 
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As shown in Table 8, by 2020 some 40% of the EU budget would have 
been financed by the FTT and VAT-based resources. A similar amount 
would have been provided by the GNI-based resource, hence meeting 
Parliament’s request to reduce the share of GNI-based contributions to a 
maximum of 40%, and the balance by TOR resources.46 
Table 8. Estimated evolution of the structure of EU financing (2012-2020) 
 
Draft budget 2012 2020 
€ billion % of own resources € billion 
% of own 
resources 
Traditional own resources 19.3 14.7 30.7 18.9 
Existing national 
contributions, of which: 111.8 85.3 65.6 40.3 
VAT-based own resource 14.5 11.1 - - 
GNI-based own resource 97.3 74.2 65.6 40.3 
New own resources 
of which: 
- - 66.3 40.8 
New VAT resource - - 29.4 18.1 
EU financial transaction 
tax - - 37.0 22.7 
Total own resources 131.1 100.0 162.7 100.0 
Source: European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision on the system of own 
resources of the European Union, COM (2011) 510, Brussels, 29 June 2011, p. 5. 
New VAT-based resource 
The Commission has explored two options for a new VAT-based resource: a 
parallel system to that operating in the member states and a revenue transfer 
mechanism. The first option has been discarded because the Commission 
thought that a VAT-based resource alongside member states' VAT would 
have led in practice to the creation of a double VAT system. The Commission 
opted therefore for the simplest solution, considered equivalent in terms of 
revenue but with limited impact on businesses and less impact on national 
tax administrations.  
                                                   
46 See, for example, European Parliament, Resolution of 3 July 2013 on the political 
agreement on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020, paragraph 13. 
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The VAT-based resource would have derived from the application of 
a single EU rate (maximum 2%) on the net value of supplies of goods and 
services, intra-EU acquisitions of goods and the importation of goods that 
are subject to the standard VAT rate in every member state. This means that 
a standard-rated supply in a member state would have been subject to the 
VAT own resource unless the same supply was subject to a reduced rate or 
an exemption in another member state. Thus, the tax base would have 
corresponded to the smallest common denominator of national VAT 
systems. 
In practice, the VAT-based resource would have required: 
 The Commission to calculate (on the basis of national accounts data, 
consumption data or other sources) a single EU-wide average 
proportion of VAT receipts from common standard-rated transactions 
in every member state; and 
 Each member state to apply this proportion to its total VAT receipts. 
Then it would have used its own standard rate to obtain its chargeable 
base, and applied the call rate for own resources to the chargeable base 
to determine the EU budget revenue. Unlike the existing VAT-based 
resource, the revenue stream would not have been capped in 
percentage of the GNI.  
The Commission’s proposal raises a number of critical issues: 
 The proposed new VAT-based resource beats a retreat from a previous 
proposition made in 2004 (and confirmed in 2010), which aimed at 
introducing a VAT-based resource through an EU VAT rate, 
incorporated in and levied together with the national rate, and thus on 
the same taxable base.47 The EU VAT rate would have created a visible 
and direct link with the citizen. At the same time, citizens would not 
have supported an additional tax burden as the EU VAT rate would 
have been offset by an equivalent decrease of the national VAT rate. 
Member states would have transferred to the EU budget the same 
percentage of each national VAT base. Despite the fact that this 
proposal would have met Parliament’s longstanding request for a 
genuine VAT own resource, the Commission did not table any 
concrete legislative proposal in this respect. 
                                                   
47 See European Commission, “Financing the European Union”, Vol. I, COM (2004) 
505 final, p. 11 and Vol. II, p. 53, Brussels, 14 July 2004; “The EU Budget review”, 
Technical annexes, SEC (2010) 7000, Brussels, 19 October 2010, p. 34.  
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 Since it would have been levied on member states and not on citizens, 
the new VAT-based resource did not seek to provide a solution to the 
opacity of the EU financing system. Due to the absence of an explicit 
link with the taxpayer, this resource would have continued to be 
perceived as a national expenditure. 
 If some simplification would have been introduced compared to the 
current arrangements, the new VAT-based resource would have 
required the establishment of an EU-wide ‘common’ basket of 
standard-rated goods and services. On this basis, the Commission 
would have determined a single EU-wide average proportion of VAT 
receipts from standard-rated transactions in every member state. This 
one-off calculation for the whole period 2014-2020 would have been 
based on the same type of complex statistical data used for the 
calculation of the current VAT-based resource.48 Thus, the accuracy of 
this calculation would have been of the outmost importance and 
would have depended on the availability of uniform or equivalent 
sources and statistical methods. Moreover, the ‘common’ basket 
mentioned above should have been monitored on a regular basis to 
ensure its continued relevance due to the variation over time of the 
scope of the rates in the different member states. The fact that the 
Commission did not reveal the member states’ share within its overall 
estimate (see Table 8 above), seems to confirm that this calculation may 
not have represented a straightforward process.  
Financial transaction tax 
The significant amount of public funds expended to bail out the financial 
sector during the global economic crisis has triggered a broad demand, 
advocated in particular by the European Parliament, for a ‘Robin Hood’ tax 
to correct for the current under-taxation in that sector, to contribute to the 
costs of dealing with the crisis and reduce public deficits.49 
                                                   
48 See European Court of Auditors, Opinion No 2/2012 of 20 March 2012, point 17.  
49 See for example European Parliament Resolutions of 8 June 2011, op. cit., of 23 
May 2012 on the proposal for a Council directive on a common system of financial 
transaction tax and amending Directive 2008/7/EC; of 21 May 2013 on the Annual 
Tax Report: how to free the EU potential for economic growth; of 3 July 2013 on the 
proposal for a Council directive implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of 
financial transaction tax. The Commission has indicated that EU member states have 
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This development has prompted the Commission to consider forms of 
taxation for the financial sector and to envisage using part of the resulting 
revenue to finance the EU budget. The Commission analysed two basic 
options: a financial transaction tax (FTT) and a financial activities tax (FAT) 
as proposed by the IMF’s Report to the G-20.50 It concluded that an FTT was 
the preferred option, taking into account its revenue potential and its impact 
on excessive specific risk-taking. Thus, the Commission adopted in 
September 2011 a proposal for a Council Directive on an EU FTT common 
system whose main objectives were: 
- To tackle fragmentation of the Single Market that an uncoordinated 
patchwork of national financial transaction taxes would create; 
- To ensure that the financial sector makes a fair and substantial 
contribution to public finances with a view to cover the cost of the crisis 
and also to reduce member states' contributions to the EU budget; and 
- To create, through a kind of ‘polluter-pays’ principle, appropriate 
disincentives for financial transactions that do not contribute to the 
efficiency of financial markets or to the real economy.51 
According to the Commission, an FTT collected at EU level would 
constitute a first step towards its application at global level. At the same time, 
the allocation of part of its revenue to the EU budget would provide new 
sources of revenue whilst reducing member states’ juste retour claims. 
The suggested introduction of an FTT has generated from the outset a 
significant discussion on the realism of its alleged benefits and on the risk of 
delocalisation of financial services in the absence of a general application 
                                                   
committed €4.6 trillion to bail out the financial sector during the financial crisis 
whilst this sector enjoys a tax advantage of approximately €18 billion per year 
because of the VAT exemption on financial services (see European Commission, 
Press release IP/11/1085 of 28 September 2011). The reason for VAT exemption of 
most financial services is that the major part of financial services' income is margin-
based and therefore is not easily taxable under the current VAT arrangements. 
50 See M. Keen., R. Krelove and J. Norregaard, “The Financial Activities Tax”, in S. 
Claessens, M. Keen and C. Pazarbasioglu (eds), Financial Sector Taxation, The IMF's 
Report to the G-20 and Background Material, International Monetary Fund, 
Washington, D.C., September 2010, p. 118. 
51 See European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on a common system 
of financial transaction tax and amending Directive 2008/7/EC, COM (2011) 594, 
Brussels, 28 September 2011. 
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outside the FTT area. For example, Parliament remarked that the “FTT will 
truly achieve its objectives only if it is introduced at global level”.52 
Obviously, the debate on the introduction of an FTT reflected the 
significant interests at stake, not just of the financial sector but also at the 
level of the member states. In this respect, it appeared clear by mid-2012 that 
the Commission’s proposal for introducing an FTT harmonised at EU level 
was unlikely to receive the required member states’ unanimous support in 
the foreseeable future. Therefore, on the basis of the request of 11 member 
states (Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Austria, 
Portugal, Slovenia and Slovakia), the Commission submitted a proposal for 
enhanced cooperation in the area of a financial transaction tax. The proposal 
was endorsed by the Council early 2013.53 
To prevent driving taxable financial transactions outside the 11 
participating member states, the FTT proposed by the Commission would 
apply on the basis of the principle of the country of residence of the financial 
institution, supplemented by the country of issuance principle. Thus, 
financial transactions would be taxed, regardless of where the transaction 
takes place in the world. The FTT would not concern transactions involving 
                                                   
52 See European Parliament, Resolution of 3 July 2013, op. cit. For a review of pro 
and contra arguments, see PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, “Financial transaction tax: 
The impact and arguments”, November 2013 
(www.abi.org.uk/~/media/Files/Documents/Publications/Public/2013/Taxatio
n/Financial%20Transaction%20Tax%20Literature%20Review.ashx). 
53 Enhanced cooperation (see Article 20 TEU and Articles 326 to 334 TFEU) aims to 
overcome a situation whereby it proves difficult to reach unanimous agreement 
among member states, thus allowing those wanting to move ahead with a common 
approach to do so. A minimum of nine member states are needed for enhanced 
cooperation to be allowed. Shortly after the Council approval, the United Kingdom 
lodged an action in the European Court of Justice against the Council Decision, on 
the ground that it is contrary to Article 327 TFEU because it authorises the adoption 
of an FTT with extraterritorial effects which will fail to respect the competences, 
rights and obligations of the non-participating states (see Case law C-209/13, United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Council of the European Union). 
In its ruling of 30 April 2014, the European Court of Justice confirmed the legality of 
the enhanced cooperation and rejected as premature and speculative the United 
Kingdom’s arguments on the impact of the FTT on non-participating member states, 
since the tax has not yet been adopted. One may expect that the contention will 
emerge again once the implementing measures will be ultimately adopted by the 
participating member states. 
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private households or small and medium enterprises (SMEs) such as house 
mortgages, bank borrowings by SMEs or insurance contracts. Currency 
exchange transactions and the raising of capital by enterprises or public 
bodies would not be taxed either. The proposed taxation minimum rates are 
at 0.1% for shares and bonds, units of collective investment funds, money 
market instruments, repurchase agreements and securities lending 
agreements, and 0.01% for derivative products. Participating member states 
would be free to apply higher rates.54 
The main taxpayers should be the financial institutions operating 
financial transactions and actually around 85% of the transactions take place 
purely between them. However, as any tax has in the end to be paid by 
somebody, financial institutions would most likely pass on the cost to their 
clients. The FTT will thus have a progressive distributional implication, 
putting the burden on richer individuals.  
Whether and to what extent, final payers will be made aware that a 
part of the tax might accrue to the EU budget remains an open question. 
Initially, it was envisaged that the FTT would be collected by economic 
operators rather than by the member states. Indeed, given the relative 
limited number of centres of taxation, it would have been possible to set up 
a relatively straightforward collection system managed at EU level and, 
hence, a direct source of financing for the EU budget. This option has been 
superseded by the proposed FTT Directive providing that member states’ 
administrations will be responsible for collecting the tax. 
The intention of participating countries is to work on a progressive 
implementation of the FTT, focusing initially on  the taxation of shares and 
some derivatives. The objective is still to reach an agreement on this first 
stage before the end of 2014. Three issues lie at the heart of the discussions: 
the scope of application of the tax (which shares and derivatives); whether it 
will use the principle of country of residence of the financial institution or of 
the country of issuance; the arrangements for the payment of the tax and 
how the income generated is to be shared out. 
According to the Commission’s revenues projections, the FTT applied 
under enhanced cooperation would generate, depending on market 
reactions, between €30 and €35 billion a year (of which more than one-third 
                                                   
54 See European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive implementing 
enhanced cooperation in the area of financial transaction tax, Brussels, COM (2013) 
71, Brussels, 14 February 2013. See also the Press release MEMO/13/98 of 14 
February 2013. 
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would come from securities and the rest from derivatives), so slightly more 
than half of what could have been expected for an implementation in all 
member states. These projections (see Figure 6) are based on the share of each 
participating member state in total FTT revenues, with reference to the size 
of their underlying economies. On this basis, the amounts could range from 
€95 million for Estonia to €11.75 billion for Germany. 
Figure 6. Breakdown of revenues according to GDP in PPS (2011) in member states 
participating in enhanced cooperation on FTT 
 
Source: European Commission, “Impact assessment of the proposed Directive 
implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of financial transaction tax”, SWD (2013) 
28, 14 February 2013, p. 24. 
According to the Commission’s estimates, an FTT applied at EU level 
could have provided to the EU budget by 2020 an amount of €37 billion a 
year, which would fund around 23% of its expenditure (see Table 8). With 
the application of the FTT to 11 member states, a proportional reduction 
would leave available for the EU budget around €21 billion a year, or 13% of 
the revenue needs estimated. However, due in particular to the risk of 
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delocalisation mentioned above and the intrinsic variations of the 
underlying economic context, the actual amount of FTT revenue is rather 
unpredictable. Such instability would likewise create tensions at the level of 
the balancing resource, the GNI-based resource. The above shows that in the 
current circumstances, the FTT does not fulfil one key criteria to become an 
own resource, namely the maturity and stability of its assessment basis. 
Furthermore, the European Council made clear that the enhanced 
cooperation on the FTT would not impact non-participating member states 
and the calculation of the UK rebate.55 This means that while the overall 
resources to be allocated to the EU budget will remain unchanged, the FTT 
revenue would reduce by the same amount the volume of the GNI resource 
for the 11 member states. Yet, for these member states the reduction of their 
payments for the GNI resource (calculated on the basis of the ratio in the 
total EU GNI) may not necessarily compensate their payments out of the FTT 
revenue. Some participating member states could claim to face an imbalance 
and therefore insist on obtaining either an alignment of their GNI and FTT 
contributions or another form of compensation. In both cases the raison d’être 
of the FTT revenue as a financing source for the EU budget would disappear. 
Finally, as several member states are strongly opposed to the 
introduction of an FTT, it seems inconsistent with the idea of a budget for all 
European citizens, to fund part of it through an earmarked tax applied by 
only some of them. In any event, financing the EU budget with a share of the 
FTT revenue will not make this tax more effective in reaching its underlying 
objectives. Indeed, the regulation of the markets and the wish to ask the 
financial sector to contribute to a reduction of public deficits can be (and 
actually is) pursued by member states in different ways. 
Correction mechanism 
As discussed above, one of the aims of the Commission’s proposals to amend 
the own resources system was the progressive phasing-out of all correction 
mechanisms. In this respect, the Commission recalled the principles set at 
the 1984 Fontainebleau European Council (and reiterated by the 1999 Berlin 
European Council), indicating that expenditure policy is ultimately the 
essential means of resolving the question of budgetary imbalances and that 
any member state sustaining a budgetary burden that is excessive in relation 
                                                   
55 See European Council conclusions of 7-8 February 2013, document EUCO 37-13, 
op. cit., point 115.  
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to its relative prosperity may benefit from a correction at the appropriate 
time. The Commission clarified in particular that a correction mechanism 
“should be closely related to the expenditure policy enshrined in the 
multiannual financial framework”, it should reflect “the important 
developments in the financing of the Union” and take account of the levels 
of prosperity of the member states concerned.56 The Commission also 
pointed out: “In the context of a reform of EU financing, any new correction 
mechanism will need to be carefully justified, not only by way of debatable 
accounting measurements (…), but in view of the overall balance of benefits 
brought by the EU budget and policies, and reflect the relative prosperity of 
the Member States concerned.”57 The Commission finally elaborated some 
guiding principles for defining and assessing possible correction 
mechanisms for the future: ‘Fairness’, ‘Transparency and Simplicity’, 
‘Limited in time’ and ‘No negative impact on incentives to implement EU 
budget’.58 
The Commission started its analysis from an assessment of the 
justification of the current UK rebate. Similarly to prior reviews made in 1998 
and 2004, the Commission concluded that the context at the basis of the 
creation of the UK rebate in 1984 (low UK share in EU agricultural 
expenditure on which the EU budget was concentrated; and high share of 
the UK VAT base in relation to its GNP) had evolved fundamentally.59 Most 
importantly, being based on a conventional ceiling on the United Kingdom’s 
budgetary balance, the rebate takes no account of the evolution of the 
relative wealth of a country that was one of the poorest member states at 
accession but has become since then one of the richest. Despite a change in 
                                                   
56 See European Commission, COM (2011) 739 of 9 November 2011, op. cit., Recitals 
No 11 and 12. 
57 See European Commission,  SEC (2011) 876 of 27 October 2011, op. cit., p. 44. 
58 See European Commission,  SEC (2011) 876 of 27 October 2011, op. cit., pp. 46-47. 
The principle ‘No negative impact on incentives to implement EU budget’ refers to 
the fact that the current UK rebate, based on net balances, reduces the incentive for 
the country to spend money allocated to it in the context of EU policies: two-thirds 
of EU payments are cancelled out by a reduction of the UK rebate. 
59 For the 1998 analysis, see European Commission, COM (1998) 560 of 7 October 
1998, op. cit., p. 20 and Annex IV; for the 2004 analysis, see European Commission, 
COM (2004) 505 final of 14 July 2004, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 18; for the 2011 analysis, see 
European Commission, COM (2011) 510 of 29 June 2011, op. cit., pp. 5-8 and SEC 
(2011) 876 of 27 October 2011, op. cit., part III, p. 41. 
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the rebate’s arrangements to avoid an inflation of its amount due to the 
additional enlargement-related expenditure after 2004, the size of the UK 
rebate remains at a significant level and with an upward trend (see Figure 
3). 
Hence, to address a difference of treatment with other major net 
contributors, the Commission proposed replacing all existing correction 
mechanisms with a system of lump-sum reductions on GNI-based resource 
payments. In particular, for the period 2014–2020, a gross reduction in 
annual GNI contributions should have been granted to Germany, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom for an overall amount of €7.5 
billion (€4.333 billion net).60 
At first sight, a lump-sum system meets the criteria of simplicity and 
creates no particular disincentives in implementing EU policies. When 
assessing the Commission’s proposal against the criteria of ‘transparency’, 
one should note that the decision on which member states should benefit 
from a lump-sum correction has been based on a net balance indicator and 
an analysis of the ratio of that balance to relative prosperity. Then, the 
corrections were calibrated so that the four member states mentioned above 
arrive at a comparable ratio. However, while acknowledging that a 
“correction should be transparent and easy to understand”, and that lump-
sum reduction on GNI payments would apply strictly to those member 
states “for which a perceived excessive budgetary burden can be 
demonstrated”,61 the Commission did not make explicit the criteria used to 
                                                   
60 See European Commission, COM (2011) 510 of 29 June 2011, op. cit., p. 7 and p. 
17. According to data provided by the Commission to the European Court of 
Auditors, the gross and net reductions in GNI contributions would have been as 
follows: Germany €2.5 billion gross and €0.99 billion net; the Netherlands €1.05 
billion gross and €0.683 billion net; Sweden €0.35 billion gross and €0.119 billion net; 
the United Kingdom €3.6 billion gross and €2.542 billion net (see European Court of 
Auditors, Opinion No 2/2012 of 20 March 2012, op. cit., point 39). In theory, the 
difference between ‘gross’ and ‘net’ is explained by the fact that, unlike for the 
current UK rebate, also member states benefitting for such corrections would 
participate in their financing. However, in the absence of the underlying calculation, 
it is not possible to explain why this difference is of -29% for the United Kingdom 
while for the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden the difference is respectively –35%, 
–60% and –66%.  
61 See European Commission, COM (2011) 739 of 9 November 2011, op. cit., Recital 
No 11, and SEC (2011) 876 of 27 October 2011, op. cit., p. 47.  
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define when the budgetary burden of a member state can be considered 
excessive and it has not unveiled the details of its calculations, including to 
the Court of Auditors.62 Also, the Commission did not foresee a mechanism 
for monitoring, over time, whether a budgetary burden continues to be 
excessive and whether other member states would qualify for a correction. 
In particular, there is no indication that the Commission has reached 
its conclusion on which member states should be granted a correction on the 
basis of an assessment “of the overall balance of benefits brought by the EU 
budget and policies”.63 Most likely, this conclusion has been drawn from the 
usual net-balance calculations, on the basis of an estimated allocation of 
expenditure of the 2014-2020 MFF. Yet, as underlined by the Commission 
itself, such calculations are merely an accounting exercise of certain financial 
costs and benefits, based on ‘arbitrary’ and ‘highly questionable’ 
conventions. 
Without access to the methodology used and the underlying data, an 
evaluation of the ‘fairness’ of the Commission's proposal is hardly possible. 
This is particularly the case for understanding on what basis, despite high 
levels of prosperity achieved by the four member states mentioned above, 
only them and no other net-payer countries can justify a budgetary burden 
that might be considered excessive when compared to their relative 
prosperity. For example, in the period 2007-2013 (see Table 6), Germany, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom have contributed 
proportionally less than their share in the GNI. The opposite is true for 
France and (notably) Italy, which, as shown in Table 7 (column 3), have 
recorded a lower relative prosperity during 2007-2013 (measured in GNI-
PPS per capita) than Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. At the same time (see column 6), France’s contribution (per capita) 
is higher than that of all latter member states; and Italy’s contribution (per 
capita) is higher than that of the Netherlands.  
Furthermore, it could have been useful to consider the anticipated 
‘operating budgetary balances’ ratio in relation to GNI for the period 2014-
2020. This is because, compared to the 2007-2013 period, one should note not 
only an overall reduction of funds (almost -4%) but also significant changes 
in the Headings. This is notably the case for ‘Competitiveness for growth 
and jobs’ (+37%); ‘Economic, social and territorial cohesion’ (-8%); 
                                                   
62 See European Court of Auditors, Opinion No 2/2012 of 20 March 2012, op. cit., 
point 43. 
63 See European Commission,  SEC (2011) 876 of 27 October 2011, op. cit., p. 44. 
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‘Sustainable Growth: Natural Resources’ (-11%) and ‘Security and 
citizenship’ (+27%). In the absence of the anticipated ‘operating budgetary 
balances’ ratio for the period 2014-2020, the best proxy available is the ratio 
based on the outturn 2017-2013 (see Figure 5). One may see that the negative 
balance ratio of Belgium and Denmark, for which the Commission has not 
proposed a correction in the current period, is higher or comparable to that 
of Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom (whose 
negative balance is the lowest after Finland and Austria). Finally, only 
Belgium, Sweden and Germany (with respectively, -0.36%, -0.36% and -037% 
of their GNI) have exceeded the threshold set by the Commission in 2004 as 
the maximum accepted level of financial solidarity (-035% of a member 
state’s GNI), beyond which a correction was deemed justified.64 Still, the 
rationale of this threshold is purely conventional and, as discussed above, 
the differences in the pattern of expenditure in the 2014-2020 period may 
well have an impact in the ultimate destination of EU funds. 
Due to the difficulties mentioned above, it is not possible for 
parliaments and indeed for EU citizens (who will be ultimately affected by 
the resulting burden-sharing) to exert a proper scrutiny of the Commission’s 
proposal, in line with the principles of transparency and openness set in the 
Treaties.65 
This absence of transparency adds opacity to a system already 
criticised for its opaqueness. It generates mistrust among member states and 
it therefore provides an objective ground for keeping the status quo. Indeed, 
                                                   
64 The Commission proposed in 2004 to introduce a generalised correction 
mechanism, as a sort of safety net for large net-payers whose contributions 
(calculated on the basis of the net budgetary balance) exceeded 0.35% of a member 
state’s GNI. Net positions exceeding such a threshold would have been eligible for 
a correction (at a rate of 66%). The maximum refund volume was limited to €7.5 
billion a year, financed by all member states based on their relative share of GNI (see 
European Commission, COM (2004) 505 final of 14 July 2004, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 41). 
The Commission’s proposal was eventually not adopted. It should be noted that a 
number of correction mechanisms have been envisaged over the years (for a review, 
see Heinemann et al., 2008, p. 110). Although using different definitions of 
‘budgetary balances’, all these mechanisms are based on a balance of member states’ 
contributions to and payments from the EU budget. Therefore, they face the same 
conceptual weaknesses as the Commission’s calculations, as discussed in the section 
‘To each its own’.  
65 See Articles 1 TEU, 10 TEU, 13(1) TEU and 15 TFEU. 
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neither the current UK rebate nor the related abatements on this rebate 
granted to Germany, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden have expiration 
dates, since they are part of the own resources decision, which remains 
applicable until a new one is (unanimously) adopted. These abatements are 
therefore ‘ironclad’. This shows that the UK rebate lies at the crossroad of 
any reform of the EU financing system.  
Finally, concerning the proposed limitation in time of the lump sums, 
linking corrections to the MFF duration would only provide an apparent 
progress. This is because a limitation in time will not represent by itself a 
guarantee against perpetuation of such corrections, as shown by the outcome 
of the 2014-2020 MFF negotiation.66 Once granted, a reduction in the 
contributions to the EU budget tends to be considered by the beneficiary 
member states as an acquis. 
Reducing the burden on national budgets? 
One of the key aims pursued by the 2011 Commission’s proposals for 
reforming the revenue system was to relieve the current burden on national 
Treasuries to finance the EU budget. This objective was linked in particular 
to the introduction of the FTT, whose revenue should have reduced national 
contributions by an equal amount. Yet, there is no ‘magic’ in this initiative 
as the FTT will in principle increase overall taxation, although by putting its 
burden on richer individuals. Regardless of whether or not a share of the 
FTT revenue will finance the EU budget, member states will still have to 
provide the same amount of resources to fund the EU budget. Hence, the 
impact of funding the EU budget through the FTT would be limited to a 
different distribution among national fiscal resources in backing the own 
resources payments; no more than a clearing entry in national accounts. 
Still, reducing the burden on public budgets, notably in times of 
financial constraints, is a legitimate objective. A first main direction to 
progress towards this objective is through the rationalisation of expenditure, 
in particular with the aim of looking at the EU and the national budgets as 
integrated instruments of public policies. As noted by Parliament, since the 
                                                   
66 For example, the 2007-2013 MFF provided for differentiated call-up rates for the 
VAT-based contribution and gross reductions of the GNI contributions for some 
member states. The 2014-2020 MFF continues to provide similar forms of 
compensation for those countries. See the section ‘EU revenue: A short history’.  
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volume of the EU budget is very limited compared to national budgets, there 
is a need to create synergies between these budgets in order to implement 
common EU strategies, giving greater impact to European policies.67 The 
idea is that less funds from the EU budget do not necessarily mean less 
public funds for a given policy, but rather the choice for a different level of 
government, also in view of the specific needs of each of the member states. 
The awareness of this issue is witnessed by a declaration of the 
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission that agreed, in view 
of the preparation for the post-2020 multiannual financial framework, “to 
work together with the objective of cost savings and better synergies at 
national and European levels in order to improve the effectiveness of public 
spending in matters subject to the EU's action’’.68 The mid-term 
review/revision of the MFF to be undertaken by the end of 2016 actually 
provides a first opportunity in this respect. 
One area deserving particular attention seems to be research spending 
for which the Treaty already provides (Article 181(1) TFEU) that “The Union 
and the Member States shall coordinate their research and technological 
development activities so as to ensure that national policies and Union 
policy are mutually consistent”. Putting in place the European Research 
Area (ERA) as a unified research platform will require greater collaboration 
from the EU and national levels, within individual countries and also at EU 
level where the Research and Cohesion programmes provide the most 
significant funding opportunities. As indicated by the Commission, “Europe 
needs critical mass to efficiently address grand challenges and to make the 
best use of available resources in Europe”.69 The significant number of actors, 
levels and objectives pursued makes the duplication of efforts a significant 
risk. Addressing such risk through a more strategic alignment of the various 
research programmes might save resources and, most importantly, avoid an 
                                                   
67 See European Parliament, Resolution of 15 June 2010 on the mandate for the 
trilogue on the 2011 draft budget, paragraph 15. 
68 See Joint Declaration by Parliament, Council and Commission on improving 
effectiveness of public spending in matters subject to EU's action, Council document 
15997/13, ADD 1, Brussels, 25 November 2013. 
69 See European Commission, “European Research area progress report 2013”, COM 
(2013) 637, Brussels, 20 September 2013, p. 4. As pointed out by Núñez Ferrer & 
Katarivas (2014:1), while the EU R&D share of expenditure as a percentage of the 
total is only 5%, the fact that this funding excludes many capital expenditures that 
member states cover (e.g. buildings, existing machinery, non-R&D linked staff) 
means that EU funding is essential in some EU priority areas of research. 
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indiscriminate fiscal consolidation at the expense of R&D, which could 
potentially threaten the chances for increasing economic growth and job 
creation in the future. 
Yet, a main avenue for reducing the burden on public budgets is to 
ensure that all revenue that should accrue to them is actually collected. In 
this respect, in the framework of a wider reform initiated by its Green Paper 
on the future of VAT, the Commission has identified in the VAT area a 
potential to generate new revenue streams, for both national budgets and the 
EU budget: 
Broadening the tax base, reducing the scope for fraud, improving 
the administration of the tax and reducing compliance costs in the 
context of a broad reform of VAT, could deliver important results 
and generate new revenue streams for the Member States. A 
fraction of the gains derived from this initiative could be attributed 
to the EU level, and these could be further increased as the VAT 
system improved its performance.70 
It is a fact that member states’ VAT losses are significant.71 The 
magnitude of uncollected VAT revenue represents a ‘litmus test’ of a 
country’s ability to manage the tax effectively, in particular of the strength 
of its management system in terms of its day-to-day supervision (for 
example, the possibility of performing a sufficient number of far-reaching 
controls involving often complex relations between various operators) and 
of the legislative framework in which it operates (fraud opportunities 
offered by regulatory loopholes). 
                                                   
70 See European Commission,  SEC (2011) 876 of 27 October 2011, op. cit., p. 5. For 
the Green Paper on the future of VAT, see European Commission, “Towards a 
simpler, more robust and efficient VAT system”, COM (2010) 695, Brussels, 1 
December 2010. 
71 A conventional way to establish a proxy of VAT losses consists in calculating the 
‘VAT gap’, i.e. the difference between the expected VAT revenue and VAT actually 
collected. It is commonly thought that VAT fraud is an important contributor to this 
revenue shortfall. An estimated €177 billion in VAT revenues was lost due to non-
compliance or non-collection in 2012 (€171 billion in 2011), according to the latest 
VAT gap study published by the Commission. This equates to 16% of total expected 
VAT revenue of 26 member states (see European Commission, Press release 
MEMO/14/602, 23 October 2014, p. 3). For an example of the approach in 
calculating the tax gap, see S. Pisani, “Tax Gap and the Performance of the Italian 
Revenue Agency: An ongoing project”, presentation at the International Tax 
Analysis Conference 2014, 20-21 January 2014, London.  
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In this respect, it is well known that the VAT intra-EU regime has 
raised significant concerns since its introduction on 1 January 1993. This 
system, which was supposed to last for four years only, has remained in 
force until now due to member states’ failure to reach agreement on a 
definitive system based on taxation at the origin. The fundamental weak 
point of this system is the fact that taxation follows the principle of 
destination, so that goods circulate tax-free between member states. Whilst 
supplies are exempt of VAT in the member state of departure, these still 
qualify for a right to deduction or reimbursement of the VAT paid as input 
tax in that member state. As acknowledged by the European Court of Justice, 
because of the abolition of frontier within the Union, it is difficult for the tax 
authorities to satisfy themselves that the goods have or have not physically 
left the territory of the member state of departure. It is principally on the 
basis of the evidence provided by taxable persons (such as accounts, 
transport documents, invoices, settlement documents) and of their 
statements that the tax authorities so satisfy themselves.72 
In order to compensate for the elimination of customs formalities and 
checks, and avoid losses of tax revenue, a computerised system for the 
automatic exchange of information on the value of intra-EU deliveries 
declared by traders was set up in each member state (VAT information 
exchange system or VIES). At the same time, a system (Intrastat) for 
collecting statistics on the movement of goods between the member states 
has been put in place. Moreover, a number of initiatives (for example, 
Fiscalis) and legislative measures have been introduced to facilitate 
cooperation among national administrations.73 The magnitude of VAT losses 
shows, however, that such measures are not sufficient. As explained by the 
Commission, the VAT intra-EU regime gives member states “the illusion of 
having retained full sovereignty in determining their revenues and the 
                                                   
72 See European Court of Justice, Case law C-409/04 Teleos and others v. 
Commissioners of Customs and Excise, [2007] ECR I-7797, paragraph 44. The 
European Commission has just unveiled five options for a future VAT system, based 
on the principle of destination, to replace the current temporary system (see 
European Commission, Press release IP/14/1216 of 30 October 2014).  
73 For example, there are provisions at EU level for mutual assistance between the 
member states, in particular concerning the recovery of taxes and the administrative 
cooperation in the field of VAT. Also, a guide on Risk Management for tax 
administrations has been established (see 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/tax_cooperation/index_en.htm). 
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overall operation of the VAT system”. In reality, however, they have no 
“certainty of being able to receive the revenues to which they are entitled”.74 
It should also be highlighted that the components of the VAT 
assessment base are equally at the origin of taxpayers’ returns for direct 
taxation and social security contributions. The amounts at stake in these 
cases are, moreover, much higher than for VAT alone.75 As the VAT base 
represents a kind of ‘benchmark’ for all tax returns, VAT avoidance 
generates a ‘domino effect’ on simultaneous avoidance of direct taxation 
revenue and social security contributions (Tremonti & Vitaletti, 1991:21). 
VAT avoidance is therefore no more than a component of a more general 
loss of tax revenue, putting at risk public finances and boosting the 
underground economy. In turn, the expansion of the latter has a negative 
impact on fair competition, upsetting in particular the conditions for a 
proper functioning of the internal market. Not least, VAT losses contribute 
to pushing up VAT rates (see later, Figure 7). The above discussion shows 
that the issue goes well beyond a simple question of budgetary losses. 
VAT fraud spares no member state. This is due to the development 
and proliferation of sophisticated fraud mechanisms (like the ‘carousel 
fraud’), which, taking advantage of the absence of internal borders, allows 
the launching of fraudulent operations ‘touch-and-go’.76 Yet, those same 
                                                   
74 See European Commission, “A common system of VAT, A programme for the 
Single Market”, COM (96) 328, Brussels, 22 July 1996, p. 25. 
75 See European Court of Auditors, “Special Report No 6/98 concerning the 
assessment of the system of resources based on VAT and GNP”, point 4.3. A study 
undertaken by the Italian fiscal administration shows that €1 of VAT avoided 
triggers a further loss of €2.43 in direct taxation and social security contributions (see 
L. Abritta, D. Ballanti, R. Convenevole, C. Equizzi and S. Pisani, “Agenzia delle 
Entrate, Gli effetti dell’applicazione degli studi di settore nel biennio 1998-99”, 
November 2003). 
76 In a ‘carousel fraud’ a so-called ‘conduit company’ (A) makes an exempt intra-
community supply of goods to a ‘missing trader’ (B) in another member state. This 
company (B) acquires goods without paying VAT and subsequently makes a 
domestic supply to a third company (C), called the ‘broker’. The ‘missing trader’ 
collects VAT on its sales to the ‘broker’, but does not pay the VAT to the Treasury 
and disappears. The ‘broker’ (C) claims a refund of the VAT on its purchases from 
B. Consequently, the financial loss to the Treasury equals the VAT paid by C to B. 
Subsequently, Company C may declare an exempt intra-EU supply to Company (A) 
and, in its turn, the latter may make an exempt intra-EU supply to (B) and the fraud 
54 | SIMPLICITY, TRANSPARENCY, EQUITY AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 
borders continue to exist for VAT national administrations whose 
cooperation in monitoring the compliance of intra–EU operations often 
proves to be difficult and not sufficiently timely. Not to mention the risk that 
national administrations could be reluctant to deploy efforts when a fraud 
has no budgetary effects in their own territory. 
The European Parliament called on member states to commit to the 
target of reducing the tax gap by at least one-half by 2020. Parliament also 
called upon the Commission to launch a study on possible indicators 
constituting a basis for reducing tax fraud, evasion and avoidance and, if 
appropriate, to establish a standardised set of indicators for measuring tax 
evasion and avoidance.77 
In this context, it might be worth considering a proposition whose 
initial intention was to show a possible way of moving from the current 
‘transitional’ intra-EU VAT regime to a definitive VAT regime (taxation at 
origin as envisaged by the EU legislator).78 This proposition draws from the 
Italian experience, where since 2005 VAT returns show both the tax 
assessment base and the VAT due, split between final consumers and taxable 
persons. VAT returns further allocate to each Italian region both the tax 
assessment base for final consumers and the tax due. Hence, VAT revenue 
can be attributed to each Italian region, on the basis of the actual final 
consumption as declared by taxable persons. 
This set-up mirrors the two main features of this declaration 
framework. First, a geographical allocation of VAT paid out on the basis of 
the actual final consumption, as opposed to an allocation based on the place 
where the taxable person has his or her legal fiscal seat. Hence, VAT related 
to the purchase of a good can be allocated to the region where the sale has 
taken place, whereas previously it would have been allocated to the region 
of the legal seat of the seller. It is worth noting that this geographical 
allocation of VAT revenues is achieved without the need of statistical data. 
                                                   
pattern resumes, thus explaining the term ‘Carousel fraud’ (see European 
Commission, “Report on the use of administrative cooperation arrangements in the 
fight against VAT fraud”, COM (2004) 260 of 16 April 2004, p. 6). 
77 See European Parliament, Resolution of 12 December 2013 on the call for a 
measurable and binding commitment against tax evasion and tax avoidance in the 
EU.  
78 For the details of the proposition, see R. Convenevole, Come approdare al regime 
definitivo dell'IVA nell'Unione Europea, 2011 (www.ilmiolibro.it). 
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The latter come however into play in relation to the second feature of the 
system, i.e. enlarging the scope for detection of VAT avoidance. It is a fact 
that the fight against fraud cannot imply rely on random investigations and 
has to be built into the return declaring system. In this respect, since fraud 
concentrates on final consumption, the possibility of comparing actual 
regionalised VAT consumption (on the basis of VAT returns) with 
‘household consumption’ from statistical sources provides crucial 
information for assessing patterns of VAT fraud risks at ‘regional’ level.79 
Such a model could also be of interest at EU level for the same reasons 
that reside at the basis of the Italian model, i.e. fiscal federalism and equity 
of burden-sharing among local administrative entities as well as the fight 
against VAT fraud. For example, concerning the latter, a comparison 
between administrative (VAT returns) and national accounts data clearly 
shows that in Italy the VAT gap is quite different from one region to another. 
Such comparisons provide a useful indication for risk-based controls. 
Mutatis mutandis, the same could happen at EU level, from one member state 
to another. For this to happen, VAT returns in all member states should 
provide a split of the taxable base and of the VAT due into two parts: 
domestic sales (divided by final consumers and taxable persons) and intra-
EU (by country of destination). 
The consideration of such model at EU level could provide better 
instruments to fight VAT fraud by providing tax administrations with more 
adequate information on intra-EU deliveries than is currently available. 
Several improvements could be obtained to the advantage of both the 
taxable persons and the fiscal administrations. For example, Intrastat 
declarations could be discontinued. The enhanced information available 
would improve the timely detection of fictitious operations, which are often 
a source of profit for organised crime, so as to reduce the possibility of 
engineering ‘carousel frauds’. In turn, the opportunities to supply the 
underground economy with ‘tax-free’ goods will also be reduced. By 
focusing controls on an EU-wide risk basis, indiscriminate across-the-board 
                                                   
79 Similarly, as sketched in the proposed VAT-resource in the section entitled 
“Making the VAT-resource visible to citizens”, the fact that taxable persons should 
identify in their periodic returns the part of final consumption subject to the national 
‘standard rate’ might provide useful information for the fight against the fraud. A 
match with similar information from statistical sources would reveal the VAT ‘gap’ 
for standard-rated sales and therefore provide the initial input fiscal administrations 
require to conduct a backwards check through the whole VAT chain, from wholesale 
and production up to importation. 
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controls could be reduced, and hence the burden on compliant taxable 
persons. All in all, increased compliance by taxable persons could be 
ensured, without imposing, at first sight, significant extra administrative 
costs. 
Two categories of revenue sources for the EU budget 
By stating that “The Union shall provide itself with the means necessary to 
attain its objectives and carry through its policies”, and that “the budget shall 
be financed wholly from own resources”, Article 311 TFEU does not 
prescribe the categories of resources to be tapped for funding the EU budget. 
It leaves this decision to the Council, which “may establish new categories 
of own resources or abolish an existing category”.  
In practice, two categories of resources could be envisaged. A first 
option would be, as is the case today for the GNI-based resource, to fund the 
EU budget through a levy from the cashbox of overall national taxation, 
without a link to any specific tax or individual taxpayers. A second 
possibility would be to allocate to the EU budget revenue raised from an 
explicit and visible fiscal source, for example as proposed by the European 
Commission with the FTT. Yet, these two options would entail quite 
different consequences. 
The first option reflects the concept that funding the EU budget is an 
intergovernmental matter, whose details and financial consequences are an 
issue to be decided behind closed doors. As observed by the Commission, 
this would be functional to “an idea of the Union in which citizens would be 
represented purely indirectly by their Member States. The status of the EU 
as a Union of Member States and the citizens, which is currently reflected in 
the Treaty, would be abandoned on the financing side of the budget”. In the 
end, “the special character of the EU, which is not a simple club of different 
members that are paying their membership fees”, would be called into 
question.80 
The second option would provide recognition that the European 
Union constitutes a new legal order of international law the subjects of which 
comprise not only member states but also their nationals. In this respect, the 
Treaty refers several times to the need to take decisions as openly and as 
                                                   
80 See European Commission, COM (2004) 505 final of 14 July 2004, Vol. II, op. cit., 
p. 46, and SEC (2011) 876 of 27 October 2011, op. cit., p. 2. 
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closely as possible to the citizen and provides that the EU institutional 
framework should serve the interests of both the citizens and the member 
states.81 
Transparency is another principle to be imbued in the implementation 
of the EU budget. There are multiple objectives associated with this 
principle: reinforcing institutional control and scrutiny over Union 
expenditure, enhancing the legitimacy of the administration and its 
accountability to the citizen and, last but not least, ensuring the visibility of 
Union action.82 As a result, citizens should be able to know where, and for 
what purposes, EU funds are spent. For example, for the European 
Structural and Investment Funds, in order “to ensure transparency 
concerning support from the Funds”, member states shall have a 
communication strategy for each operational programme and notably 
provide information to the public about the operations supported, including 
a summary for citizens of the content of implementation reports.83 
A fiscal source to fund the EU budget would establish a parallelism 
between the right of citizens to be kept informed on the use of public funds 
with their equal right to be informed about the burden they support. As 
observed by the Commission, the lack of a direct relationship between 
citizens and the EU budget financing is a “manifestation of the ‘democratic 
deficit’”.84 Moreover, as discussed in the section “What do ’own resources’ 
actually mean?”, member states’ own budgetary documents provide an 
incomplete and not transparent accounting of their contributions to the EU 
                                                   
81 See Articles 1 TEU, 10 TEU, 13(1) TEU, 15 TFEU and the Protocol (No. 2) on the 
application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. It should be 
observed that with the Declaration of the European Council of Laeken (14-15 
December 2001), the member states had already acknowledged that European 
citizens “feel that deals are all too often cut out of their sight and they want better 
democratic scrutiny” (Document SN 300/1/01 REV 1, p. 20). See also footnote 99. 
82 See Articles 34, 35 and 59(1) of Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 966/2012, op. cit. 
83 See Articles 50(9), 115, 116, 117 and Annex XII of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 (OJ L 347 of 20 
December 2013). As an example, in Italy the web portal www.opencoesione.gov.it/ 
provides information on each project co-financed during the 2007-2013 
programming cycle by Regions and State Central Administrations. 
84 See European Commission, COM (1998) 560 of 7 October 1998, op. cit., Annex II, 
p. 3. 
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budget. As a result, citizens’ comprehension of the present system is 
virtually absent. They are therefore not stimulated to demand a proper 
account-giving on the funds spent, and thus pressure from public opinion 
plays a limited role in influencing the decision-makers. Visibility of EU 
revenue would go in the same direction as the requirement, set recently by 
the Treaties (Article 318 TFEU), aiming at a better demonstration of the 
added value of EU expenditure whose main rationale is to do more and 
better than the member states can do by themselves.85 
Yet, as noted by Ehlermann (1982:586), a fiscal resource for the EU 
acquires a political dimension when it is made known to the taxpayer, and 
in particular where the member state collecting the tax acts in the name of 
the Union. Moreover, financing the EU budget through a direct entitlement 
of a fiscal source would be a critical decision with in practice no possible 
reversal. Shifting the liability of funding the EU budget from member states 
directly to citizens will open a breach in the consolidated 
‘intergovernmental’ structure for setting EU revenue arrangements. As the 
‘equity’ of contributions would have to be appreciated at the level of the 
individual citizens across Europe, rather than in a relationship between 
member states, such a shift will challenge the currently omnipresent concept 
of ‘budgetary balances’. A first outcome would be a different burden-sharing 
at member state level as compared to today’s situation. Also, since national 
administrations would be in charge of collecting EU revenue, their 
effectiveness in ensuring compliance by taxable persons will be a matter of 
growing attention at the EU level.86 
Also, visibility of EU revenue will inevitably generate an increasing 
demand for an explanation of the choices underlying EU spending 
programmes and for evidence about the results and impacts actually 
achieved. In turn, this will prompt interrogations about who should be held 
accountable for the management of EU expenditure – a responsibility that is 
currently mostly shared between the Commission and a significant number 
                                                   
85 See also the subsection entitled “The legitimacy of EU revenue”. Concerning the 
accountability for implementing the EU budget, see Cipriani (2010). 
86 An EU right of scrutiny on the effectiveness of national VAT systems has already 
been recognised by the European Court of Justice. The latter has stated that since the 
current VAT resource is based on VAT revenue collected by member states, the EU 
level is entitled, for example, to examine the effectiveness of member states’ mutual 
cooperation in fighting against fraud and tax avoidance (see European Court of 
Justice, Case law C‑539/09 European Commission v. Federal Republic of Germany, 
Judgment of 15 November 2011). 
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of member states’ bodies involved in the day-to-day management of EU 
funds. Some discomfort would inevitably be felt at the various management 
levels, not yet used to an accountability process encompassing an in-depth 
review of the results achieved.  
Not least, the visibility of EU revenue might encourage the European 
Parliament, which today does not exercise much say in the revenue field, to 
question the current member states’ absolute power. Yet, Parliament’s 
accrued responsibilities on the revenue side could represent a positive 
development as it should logically imply taking political responsibility vis-
á-vis citizens for taxation decisions underlying its spending priorities. This 
would be a natural development of the extension of the co-decision 
framework for approving the spending programmes.  
While, in principle, a EU fiscal resource would not be incompatible 
with ‘budgetary discipline’ (i.e. setting an own resources ceiling), its 
introduction could be seen as an initial step towards financial autonomy for 
the EU and the power to raise revenue at EU level. Asserting the right to 
decide autonomously on the volume of the resources for the EU budget 
could be the next step. History shows that Parliaments have won their spurs 
by obtaining the power to levy taxes. 
Back to the past 
The option of funding the EU budget through a levy from the cashbox of 
overall national taxation would keep the essence of the current system, but 
in a radically simplified way, thereby meeting the first of the review’s four 
guiding principles (simplicity, transparency, equity and democratic 
accountability). Indeed, in a system where the overarching objective is to 
ensure an acceptable burden-sharing among member states on the basis of 
the ‘budgetary balances’ concept, there is a simpler solution than today’s 
VAT and GNI-based resources. A burden-sharing key similar to that 
provided by Article 200 of the EEC founding Treaty could achieve the same 
result, at a far lower administrative cost and with the advantage that such 
key could be set and adjusted according to any suitable criteria. In particular, 
the burden-sharing key could easily take account of claims of imbalance by 
some member states. A single ‘own resource’ called “Financing the EU 
budget” could be created, with an entry in each member state’s budget, 
hence ensuring more transparency compared to today’s situation. This 
resource could also play the role of top-up resource to balance the budget.  
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One could imagine a key based on member states’ share of EU GNI. 
However, as shown in the previous section “Who pays how much?”, the 
current financing arrangements do not strictly reflect member states’ share 
in the total EU GNI. This is due in particular to the UK rebate. Also, the use 
of GNI as accounting data as the basis of national contributions is not 
without difficulties, due to the challenge of meeting the required quality of 
data by member states’ statistical processes (for example, the comparability 
of sources and methods and the exhaustiveness of GNI estimates). Yet, if 
GNI cannot be taken as an undisputed basis for EU revenue, the burden-
sharing among member states could still be based on any other acceptable 
key, whether an approximation of the GNI share or other criteria. In this 
respect, column 3 of Table 5 and column 3 of Table 6 provide examples of 
what such keys  might look like. 
By reference to the other three guiding principles of the review 
(transparency, equity and democratic accountability), such option would in 
practice from the outset sacrifice transparency and democratic 
accountability. There would be at the very best a clearer presentation in 
national budgetary documents, although out of immediate reach of a large 
majority of citizens. Furthermore, ‘equity’ would be replaced by the concept 
of ‘reasonable net contribution’ for each member state, on the basis of highly 
questionable ‘budgetary balances’ calculations.  
An EU revenue system taking the form of a burden-sharing key might 
certainly appear as a step backwards politically for the Union. However, 
borrowing the logic of the accounting principle of ‘substance over legal 
form’, a ‘true and fair view’ of the current EU revenue system would 
acknowledge that its underlying rationale is no more than finding an 
acceptable burden-sharing among member states. In fact, the option of 
‘resuscitating’ a system of contribution scales similar to that provided for by 
Article 200 EEC could even represent a more ‘European’ solution than the 
current arrangements. Indeed, at that time the Council could modify the 
contribution scales by the unanimity rule, without further confirmation by 
national parliaments.  
Making an EU resource visible to citizens 
The requirement of transparency and democratic accountability set among 
the guiding principles of the review would be best met by establishing an 
explicit and visible link between citizens and a fiscal source.  
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The choice of a fiscal resource to directly fund the EU budget is 
potentially large. Since the 1970s, a significant number of propositions have 
been put forward either to replace or to supplement existing resources.87 
Many of the proposals, however, have the characteristics of earmarked taxes, 
linked to specific fiscal policy objectives. For this reason, such taxes would 
better fit in a national context, where the fiscal competence lies. In particular, 
funding a budget for ‘Europeans’ with taxes not displaying a clear link with 
EU policies would appear rather peculiar. Also, to a greater or lesser extent, 
the assessment basis of such taxes would be narrow and uncertain. They 
would necessarily involve new administrative costs, notably because new 
collection and control systems would have to be put in place. 
As the experience with the FTT shows, creating a new tax is easier said 
than done. Moreover, a new tax just to fund the EU budget would probably 
be extremely unpopular. As discussed earlier, the EU does not have the 
power to raise taxes on its own. In this respect several member states 
explicitly rejected the idea of creating an EU tax to finance the EU budget.88 
After all, was it not also the European Parliament that recognised in 2007 
“that the time for a new European tax has not yet come in the short term”?89 
Everything seems to indicate that the way towards a direct fiscal 
source for financing the EU budget should pass through an existing tax, as 
also suggested by the European Parliament.90 In this respect, VAT seems an 
                                                   
87 For example, Aviation sector tax; Resource based on emission auctioning in the 
context of the EU Emission Trading System (ETS); Tax on energy based on the 
revised Energy Taxation Directive; EU Corporate Income Tax (EUCIT); Excise duty 
on motor fuel for transport and other energy taxes; Excise duty on tobacco and 
alcohol; Tax on corporate profits; Tax on dealings in securities; Tax on transport or 
telecommunications services; Withholding tax on interest; ECB profits (seigniorage); 
Ecotax; Taxes on currency transactions; Tax on savings; Taxes on financial 
transactions. 
88 European Commission, “Reforming the Budget, Changing Europe: Short 
Summary of Contributions”, SEC (2008) 2739, Brussels, 3 November 2008, point 3.1. 
89 See European Parliament, Resolution of 29 March 2007, op. cit., paragraph 37. 
90 The European Parliament proposed “the creation of a new system of own 
resources based on a tax already levied in the Member States, the idea being that 
this tax, partly or in full, would be fed directly into the EU budget as a genuine own 
resource, thus establishing a direct link between the Union and European 
taxpayers” (see European Parliament, Resolution of 29 March 2007, op. cit., 
paragraph 38). 
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obvious choice as it is a general tax triggered by consumers’ decisions, and 
it is charged on most goods and services. Due to its broad basis, VAT 
provides a large and stable source of revenue. In 2012, VAT revenue 
accounted for some €927 billion, or 7.1% (weighted average) of the EU 
GDP.91 VAT is thus a major source of revenue for national budgets and in 
many member states it is the most important. The majority of them have a 
standard rate at or above 20%. As shown below, the EU average VAT 
standard rate has risen strongly in recent years, from 19.5% in 2008 to 21.5% 
in 2014. This trend is explained by two main factors, namely the 
consequences of the financial and economic crisis and a longer-term shift 
towards indirect rather than direct taxation. In short, VAT as an EU own 
resource would be in line with member states’ taxation patterns and trends. 
Figure 7. Development of average standard VAT rate (EU-28, 2000-2014) 
 
Source: European Commission, “Taxation trends in the European Union”, Luxembourg, 
2014, p. 25 (simple averages, value at 01.01 of each year). 
The European Parliament has repeatedly expressed support for VAT 
as an own resource, giving several reasons for such a choice.92 VAT was 
                                                   
91 See European Commission, “Taxation trends in the European Union”, 
Luxembourg, 2014, p. 179.  
92 In 1981, Parliament requested that “VAT should no longer be collected on the basis 
of statistical estimates, but on the basis of tax declarations…so that this source of 
revenue becomes a veritable Community VAT, parallel to the national VATs, 
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considered to represent the most reliable basis for own revenue, to be 
politically controllable, well known and familiar to the taxpayer and capable 
of being harmonised throughout the EU. A genuine VAT resource would 
represent a simple and transparent way to establish a link between the 
taxpayer and the destination of the tax. VAT revenue “is politically 
defensible as its yield is dependent on economic activity and economic 
growth”.93 
VAT would also fulfil to a large extent the guiding criteria for own 
resources identified by the Commission.94By setting a specific EU VAT rate, 
this tax might potentially represent for the EU a source of independent 
revenue and therefore of financial autonomy. The transparency of the tax 
would be ensured by the fact that it is borne ultimately (and visibly) by the 
final consumer, thus making possible a link with the citizen. Finally, VAT is 
ruled by European legislation since the late 1960s, when it was progressively 
                                                   
because assessed on the same tax base, but levied at separate rates, independent of 
the national VAT rates” (see European Parliament, Resolution of 9 April 1981 on the 
Community’s own resources, paragraph 13). The draft Treaty establishing the 
European Union (known as the Spinelli Treaty), adopted by Parliament in February 
1984, confirmed the wish to finance the EU budget through a fixed percentage of the 
VAT basis (see Article 71, OJ C 77 of 19 March 1984, p. 50). This stance was 
reaffirmed in 1994, when Parliament proposed the creation, in place of the existing 
VAT and GNP resources, of a new source of revenue “which should take the form 
of a specified percentage of VAT … directly imposed on the basis of tax declarations 
and denoted as such on invoices”. Parliament pointed out that this would be “the 
most appropriate means of meeting the demands of being simple and transparent 
and constituting an effective link between the taxpayer and the destination of the 
tax (European Union)” (see European Parliament, Resolution of 21 April 1994 on a 
new system of own resources for the European Union, paragraphs 9 and 10; see also 
European Parliament Resolutions of 29 March 2007, op. cit., paragraphs 22 and 39; 
of 13 June 2012, op. cit., paragraph 3; and of 23 October 2012, op. cit., paragraph 
74(4)). 
93 See the European Parliament report (Rapporteur H. Langes) on the “System of 
Own resources in the European Union”, document A3-0228/94, 8 April 1994, 
paragraph 24, p. 15. 
94 The Commission has identified the following criteria: Sufficiency, Stability, 
Financial autonomy, Transparency, Link to EU policy, Fiscal equivalence, 
Internalising externalities, Subsidiarity principle, Limiting operating costs, Fairness 
at the level of member states, Horizontal and vertical equity for the taxpayers (see 
European Commission,  SEC (2011) 876 of 27 October 2011, op. cit., p. 13). 
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introduced as a common tax area tailored to the Single Market. VAT 
therefore displays a clear relationship to EU policies. 
As discussed earlier, the proposal of a VAT-based resource presented 
by the Commission in 2004 would have provided a solution to a major 
drawback of the current system, i.e. the absence of a direct and visible link 
to EU citizens. Drawing on this proposal, and in line with the subsidiarity 
and proportionality principles, one could actually envisage a VAT-based 
resource operating in ‘symbiosis’ with the national VAT system. Key 
features like the regulatory framework underlying the assessment basis, the 
management of the tax and its collection could rest with the national bodies. 
As a result, no dual system will need to be created. 
The VAT-based resource would not represent a true tax but a kind of 
‘simil tax’, with the following main characteristics:  
 The VAT-based resource would take the form of an EU VAT rate, 
offset by a corresponding decrease of the national VAT rate. 
Therefore, the VAT-based resource would be financially neutral for 
the final consumer. As a result, no modification of the structure of 
prices or of the behaviour of economic agents should be expected. 
 The EU VAT rate could be set in the own resources decision as an 
overall ‘ceiling’, thus respecting member states’ constitutional 
requirements. The actual rate (possibly lower) would be established 
in the frame of the annual budgetary procedure.  
 The EU VAT rate would apply on the value of final consumption of 
goods and services only. In this way, the VAT-based resource could 
weigh on the true economic impact of VAT and free itself of specific 
requirements of the VAT chain (in particular the right for deduction). 
 Being a levy on final consumption, the EU VAT rate should apply in 
principle to all goods and services.95 However, since in several 
member states a number of basic goods and services are subject to 
reduced and zero VAT rates, it would seem more ‘politically’ 
                                                   
95 An earlier Commission’s proposal of a VAT-based resource followed the same 
logic. Member states’ VAT taxable base on which the 1% levy would have been 
applied included zero-rated goods and services (see European Commission, “Report 
on the Financing of the Community Budget”, COM (87) 101, Brussels, 28 February 
1987, p. 25 and 28). As a matter of fact, the assessment basis of the current VAT-
based resource is meant to include ultimately the value of all transactions liable to 
VAT, irrespective of the rates applied (see footnote 14). 
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acceptable to apply the EU VAT rate only on goods and services that 
are subject to the national ‘standard rate’ (estimated to represent two-
thirds of the VAT base). 
 To allow the calculation of the amount due to the EU, taxable persons 
should identify in their periodical returns the part of final 
consumption subject to the national ‘standard rate’.96 Similarly, they 
should identify the EU VAT rate as part of the national rate in their 
invoices and fiscal receipts (see further the example in Figure 8). VAT 
payments arrangements to the national Treasury by taxable persons 
would not be affected. 
 Member states would pay to the EU an amount equivalent to the EU 
VAT rate applied on the final consumption at the national ‘standard 
rate’, as shown in taxable persons’ VAT returns. This should 
represent an incentive for national tax administrations to collect VAT 
revenue in full. Also, the VAT resource would fluctuate (upwards or 
downwards) with national consumption, thus putting the EU budget 
in line with economic circumstances. 
The following table shows how the EU VAT rate (1% in the example) 
would apply to two member states, each of them having three different VAT 
rates. It can be seen that the EU share will accrue from standard-rated goods 
and services only. The difference of VAT rates between member states will 
have no influence in the amount to be transferred to the EU. 
Table 9. An EU VAT rate 
  VAT rate 
Taxable 
base 
(€) 
VAT 
resource 
(€) 
VAT 
rate 
Taxable 
base 
(€) 
VAT 
resource 
(€) 
Standard 
VAT rate 
Taxable 
base 
(€) 
VAT 
resource 
(€) 
Total 
VAT 
resource 
(€) 
Member 
state A 0% 100 0 5% 1,000 0 20% 10,000 100 100 
Member 
state B 3% 150 0 6% 1,500 0 15% 10,000 100 100 
Source: Author’s own calculations. 
With reference to the review’s four guiding principles (simplicity, 
transparency, equity and democratic accountability), it is assumed that the 
requirement of transparency and democratic accountability will be met by 
                                                   
96 The alternative, consisting of in establishing the assessment basis for the EU share 
through statistical data, would create the kind of difficulties experienced for the 
current VAT and GNI-based resources, including a significant administrative cost. 
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creating an explicit and visible link between citizens and a fiscal source to 
fund the EU budget. A further key element of transparency is the fact that 
the VAT-based resource will result directly from taxable persons’ returns 
and not from a statistical calculation. 
In a context in which the EU budget is designed for the benefit of all 
Europeans and is therefore funded by the latter through a direct and visible 
contribution, the equity of the system should be assessed at the level of EU 
citizens. It might be observed in this respect that member states’ VAT 
assessment bases are not fully harmonised, notably due to VAT exemptions, 
differences in the scope of taxation and modalities to exert the right of 
deduction. Moreover, there are important divergences in the share of final 
consumption subject to the standard rate, ranging from about 40% to more 
than 90% according to the member state. This is notably due to national fiscal 
policies reflected in the application of reduced and zero-rates in some 
countries. An EU VAT rate as part of the standard rate could therefore create 
for final consumers with strictly similar consumption patterns an unequal 
treatment on the basis of their residence. 
It should be stressed that introducing a direct and visible source for 
financing the EU budget would represent first and foremost the outcome of 
a political decision aimed at enhancing the role of European citizens in the 
EU decision process, by acknowledging their role as subjects of the Union as 
reflected in the Treaties. The achievement of such objective should take 
account of different principles (in particular, citizenship, transparency, 
equality, subsidiarity and proportionality), and therefore of a number of 
requirements whose concurrent fulfilment should be guided by the need to 
place the law at the service of what is realistically possible. 
Reaching a full harmonisation of the VAT taxable basis is a complex 
process that would need time to materialise. Moreover, according to Article 
113 TFEU, the harmonisation of indirect taxation should be pursued “to the 
extent that such harmonisation is necessary to ensure the establishment and 
the functioning of the internal market and to avoid distortion of 
competition”. Full harmonisation is therefore not an end in itself and the 
differences existing among the member states should be deemed justified by 
objective grounds, in line with the applicable legislation. 
Setting-up an ad-hoc harmonised base just for the purpose of a VAT 
resource would not be without a number of difficulties. For example, the 
harmonisation of the base of the current VAT-resource is achieved through 
complex calculations and is a source of the current system’s opacity. The 
option, put forward by the Commission in 2011 in the framework of its 
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proposal for a VAT-based resource, of establishing an EU-wide ‘common’ 
basket of standard-rated goods and services would also be rather 
complicated to put in place. Most importantly, both of the above options 
would not provide a direct link with the taxpayer. 
It may also be noted that harmonisation of the assessment basis and 
‘equity’ are not necessarily correlated. In today’s revenue set-up, despite a 
full harmonisation in principle of the VAT assessment base, the VAT rate is 
‘uniform’ in name only, as a lower rate or a capping of the base is applied to 
some member states. The consequence is precisely a difference among EU 
citizens in terms of per capita contributions depending on their place of 
residence. 
In the current circumstances, and in line with the nature of ‘simil tax’ 
of the VAT-based resource designed as a tax-sharing mechanism, the equity 
for EU citizens should be ensured by applying the EU VAT rate to the same 
goods and services within the scope of the national standard rate. Such 
parallelism would free EU VAT revenue from an arbitrary exercise of 
judgment as the impact of the differences in the scope of application of 
standard-rated transactions among member states would simply reflect 
national fiscal policies, meant to be established in compliance with the VAT 
framework. One may refer, in a different context, to the EU direct aid to 
farmers whose level, despite the objective of excluding “any discrimination 
between producers or consumers within the Union” (Article 40(2) TFEU), 
may vary considerably from one farm to another, from one country to 
another or from one region to another. This shows that the achievable degree 
of harmonisation may be limited by objective factors, reflected in member 
states’ policies in view of taking account of specific situations.  
In fact, treating different situations identically is just as discriminatory 
as treating similar situations differently. Applying the EU VAT rate also to 
zero-rated transactions would create de facto a ‘tax’ on those transactions, 
whilst the objective of the EU VAT rate, as sketched above, is to be neutral 
for final consumers. A parallelism between the EU and national VAT 
standard rate would also avoid a kind of ‘fiscal schizophrenia’ in financing 
the EU and national budgets, while they are both funded by the same 
taxpayers. As provided for by the Treaties (Article 9 TEU and Article 20 
TFEU), “Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace 
national citizenship’’. There is only one taxpayer. 
Furthermore, even in the most optimistic scenario of an EU VAT rate 
of 2%, the bulk of VAT revenue will continue to derive from the application 
of national VAT rates, hence on the basis of the place of consumption. 
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Assuming that the VAT standard rate applies to two-thirds of member 
states’ VAT base, the EU share at an EU VAT rate of 2% would represent 
some €80 billion/year (or, per capita, an average contribution to the EU 
budget close to €160), while the overall VAT revenue is in the order of €927 
billion/year (2012). This means that in relative terms the impact of the EU 
VAT rate would not be such as to upset significantly EU citizens’ fiscal 
burden. 
Finally, linking EU revenue from VAT to the economic trend will 
create a parallelism  with national budgets. As envisaged 20 years ago by the 
Langes report, and most interestingly in the current economic context: “If 
national economies stagnate (as at present) both the Member States and the 
Union would have to economise.”97 This means that the requirement of a 
balanced budget might not have to be achieved in all circumstances through 
a top-up resource; a reduction of expenditure could also be considered. This 
is an issue that should be part of the annual budgetary procedure debate, in 
the light of the outcome of an on-going monitoring of expected results and 
lessons learned of the various spending programmes. While it is 
understandable that predictability is necessary in multiannual programmes, 
this principle cannot justify a member state’s ‘drawing right’ despite poor 
results, only because the overall MFF agreement is meant to be a global 
financial package. The EU added-value concept, i.e. that the raison d’être of 
EU funds is to achieve objectives beyond the member states’ reach, should 
be without exception. In this respect, visibility of EU revenue will help in 
refuting the false idea that EU funds ‘grow on trees’ and that they therefore 
constitute a kind of ‘manna’ to be taken advantage of.   
Concerning ‘simplicity’, the VAT resource sketched above would 
require taxable persons to identify in their periodical returns the part of final 
consumption subject to the national ‘standard rate’. Similarly, they will have 
to identify the EU VAT rate as part of the national rate in their invoices and 
fiscal receipts. Since such information should be readily available to taxable 
persons, it is unlikely that this new requirement would have an appreciable 
impact on their compliance costs.98 As shown below in the example of Figure 
8, retailers are accustomed to deliver a receipt for each purchase showing not 
just the final price paid by customers but also the taxable amount per rate, 
                                                   
97 See footnote 93. According to Mr Langes, in the event of unforeseeable 
circumstances, a deficit should also be permitted, although temporary and under 
strict conditions.  
98 As matter of fact, VAT returns in Italy already provide such information.   
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the VAT rate and the VAT amount payable. It would be sufficient to slightly 
‘enhance’ this information in the receipts by indicating that part of the VAT 
incorporated in the final price (1% in the example) will accrue to the EU.  
A final (but critical) issue concerns avoiding giving the impression to 
citizens that with the introduction of a EU VAT rate they would pay an 
higher tax than it is currently the case, while the aim is precisely to substitute 
the current national contributions. Indeed, the combination of ‘European’ 
and ‘tax’ could be seen as an additional burden and could therefore become 
deeply unpopular. This is a further reason for not applying the EU VAT rate 
to zero-rated transactions, as in that case the impact would be to increase 
taxation for the citizen. As shown by the following figure, this problem could 
be avoided by making clear (as shown in the white text against a dark 
background) that the overall VAT taxation will remain the same. 
One might actually argue that the principles of transparency and 
taxation by consent make visibility of EU revenue an objective in itself. Even 
in the current national contributions-based system, some progress towards 
transparency would be possible. Failing the possibility to refer to a specific 
taxable basis resulting from an EU VAT rate, fiscal receipts could already be 
used as a ‘vehicle’ to convey a message such as: “an amount equal to [0.30]% 
of the VAT assessment base is transferred to the EU budget”.  
Such forms of visibility would not need to wait until an explicit legal 
requirement is introduced. The 30-year link, although hidden, between VAT 
revenue collected by member states and funding the EU budget, would 
certainly legitimise the Commission to ‘encourage’ the introduction of forms 
of visibility for citizens, along the lines of the example in Figure 8. This could 
take the form of a specific recommendation following Article 292 TFEU, like 
the Commission did to encourage and facilitate the dissemination of 
information for voters on the occasion of the recent elections to the European 
Parliament.99 
                                                   
99 See the Commission recommendation of 12 March 2013 on enhancing the 
democratic and efficient conduct of the elections to the European Parliament (OJ L 
79 of 21 March 2013, p. 29). The Commission has stressed the need to ensure that 
democratic control and accountability occur at the level at which decisions are taken. 
In that perspective, the recommendation recalls that decisions shall be taken as 
openly and as closely as possible to the citizens, in view of reinforcing the 
democratic legitimacy of the EU decision-making process. Bringing the system 
closer to Union citizens, so the recommendation is a necessary corollary to closer 
institutional integration and an efficient means to bridge the divide between politics 
and citizens of the Union (see ‘Whereas’ 1, 2, 4, 9, 10).  
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One may actually expect that such measures could be imposed by 
themselves as a ‘best practice’, favoured by pressure from citizens and 
consumer organisations. Moreover, these measures could be implemented 
progressively, without an absolute need to introduce them in all member 
states and at the same time. 
Figure 8. Making visible the VAT accruing to the EU budget 
 
 
EU Budget [1.00%] [0.17] 
FINANCING THE EU BUDGET | 71 
Concluding remarks 
The current EU revenue system allows a stable flow of resources, in line with 
the MFF agreement. The best guarantee in this respect is that some 90% of 
these resources are handed back to member states in the form of EU 
expenditure. Yet, there are good reasons for reform, as this system does not 
score well against key criteria: simplicity, transparency, equity and 
democratic accountability. In particular, whilst the EU budget is financed 
through overall national taxation, the EU financial resources do not ensure a 
visible link with the taxpayers, leaving them in the dark. As a result, EU 
revenue arrangements are not consistent with the principles of transparency 
and taxation by consent. 
The Commission’s attempt to reform the EU revenue system for the 
MFF 2014-2020 was not successful, so that the status quo was the only course 
left. It should, however, be observed that the Commission’s proposals did 
not seek to provide a solution to the opacity of the system. Disavowing a 
prior proposition that would have established an explicit link with the 
taxpayer, the new VAT resource would have continued to be perceived as a 
national expenditure. Visibility was equally not a main concern of the 
Commission proposal for introducing a FTT. Moreover, this proposal raised 
consistent opposition from a number of member states fearing that, on 
balance, the overall impact of such tax would have been negative. Also, 
complex issues have arisen and the potential for revenue proved to be 
uncertain. Finally, the proposition for granting a correction mechanism to 
some member states lacked transparency about its underlying justification, 
hence hindering an assessment of its fairness. 
There seem to exist two main options for reforming the EU revenue 
system, i.e. a ‘member-states centred’ system and a system based on citizens’ 
direct liability. The first option could consist of coming back to the 
arrangements of the early days of the EEC Treaty, i.e. to set a burden-sharing 
key by member state. The EU revenue system could be easily fine-tuned, for 
example by reference to the current burden-sharing. The system would 
become definitively simpler (no need for the current VAT and GNI-based 
resources) and more predictable in its impact. It could notably incorporate 
any kind of correction that should be deemed necessary for any member 
state. Administrative work would be reduced to a minimum. Yet, such 
option would in practice sacrifice from the outset the requirements for 
transparency and democratic accountability. Furthermore, the ‘equity’ 
criteria would be replaced by the concept of ‘reasonable net contribution’ for 
each member state, on the basis of the highly questionable ‘budgetary 
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balances’ calculations. Still, this alternative would be a way of killing two 
birds with one stone: a radical simplification of the revenue system while 
preserving fundamentally the status quo as member states will remain the 
(pay)masters. Such an option might certainly appear as a political step 
backwards. However, the underlying rationale of the current system is no 
more than finding an acceptable burden-sharing key among member states.  
Finding a fiscal source to make individuals directly liable would be the 
second option. In this respect, VAT represents an obvious choice also 
because it would avoid creating an ad-hoc tax to fund the EU budget. A 
VAT-based resource could be set as a ‘simil tax’, operating in ‘symbiosis’ 
with the national VAT system and without the need to create a parallel 
system. Key features, such as the regulatory framework underlying the 
assessment basis, the management of the tax and its collection, could remain 
the responsibility of national bodies. Moreover, the EU revenue generated 
could follow the income trend, so as to create a parallelism with economic 
circumstances (notably in the case of economic stagnation). 
This resource would be based on an EU VAT rate as part of the national 
rate, thus ensuring visibility whilst keeping the fiscal burden unchanged for 
the final consumer. Such an option would undoubtedly meet the 
requirement of transparency and democratic accountability. To prepare the 
ground towards these objectives, the Commission could also envisage as an 
initial step encouraging member states and economic operators to introduce 
forms of transparency in fiscal receipts through a specific recommendation. 
Such a measure could actually be imposed by itself as a ‘best practice’. 
The equity of the VAT resource should be considered at the level of the 
citizens, as the ones directly supporting the burden rather than through an 
accounting balance between member states. Equity for EU citizens should be 
ensured by the fact that the EU rate would be applied to standard rated 
goods and services, within the scope of each national system. Such 
parallelism would also avoid a kind of ‘fiscal schizophrenia’ in financing the 
EU and national budgets while they are both funded by the same taxpayers.  
Concerning ‘simplicity’, taxable persons would be required to provide 
some further information that should be readily available, hence not 
implying appreciable compliance costs on business. 
Yet, financing the EU budget through a direct entitlement on VAT 
revenue, although minimal, would be a critical decision with in practice no 
possible reversal. It might potentially generate a number of far-reaching 
consequences. The effectiveness of national administrations in collecting EU 
revenue and ensuring compliance by taxable persons will be a matter of 
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growing interest for the EU level. The more so as the magnitude of the VAT 
gap is such that its negative impact goes beyond budgetary consolidation 
and also affects the functioning of the internal market. 
Shifting the liability of funding the EU budget from member states 
directly to citizens might encourage moves, notably by the European 
Parliament, to seek greater influence in the revenue field and assert a right 
of autonomous decision at EU level on the volume of the resources for the 
EU budget. Yet, Parliament’s accrued responsibilities on the revenue side 
could represent a positive development as it should logically imply taking 
political responsibility towards citizens for taxation decisions underlying its 
spending priorities.  
Visibility of EU revenue would most likely provoke a volley of 
questions from citizens, such as: What is the purpose of the EU budget? 
Whom profits from it? On whom does the burden fall? Who is managing EU 
expenditure and who is ultimately accountable for the results? Visibility of 
EU revenue could well be the detonator of an unprecedented debate about 
the EU budget, and ultimately about Europe as such. In short, visibility of 
EU revenue would doubtless represent a significant political choice. 
The two options sketched above bear witness to different visions. Yet, 
a drastic choice between the two options may not be the best way to progress 
towards a new EU revenue system. Since the EU is a Union of member states 
and their citizens, realism would recommend paying attention to concerns 
from both sides. In this perspective, a new EU revenue system could be built 
on a combination of ‘visible’ and ‘invisible’ resources, by financing  in an 
initial stage the EU budget in equal parts through a VAT-based resource, 
made visible to citizens, and a simple national contribution that could be 
used also as a top-up resource. This latter resource could be based either on 
the EU GNI share, or on any other acceptable burden-sharing key.
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Non multa sed multum. 
(Not quantity, but quality.) 
Pliny the Younger 
 
 
3. EU EXPENDITURE: THE OTHER SIDE OF 
THE SAME COIN 
s pointed out by the European Commission, “The funding must 
deliver the expected results – public authorities do not have an 
‘entitlement’ to receive funds to spend as they wish, rather they 
receive EU funding to help them deliver on commonly agreed EU 
objectives”. In this respect, the Council recently recalled that “better 
spending and sound financial management of EU funds is of a particular 
importance for the public perception of actions financed from the EU 
budget”.100 
A key argument used against the introduction of a fiscal source for the 
EU budget is that it would create hostility on the part of the public and it 
would end up decreasing its support for the EU. Indeed, the context seems 
far from being favourable as polls reveal that the majority of Europeans say 
that the EU budget “gives poor value for money for EU citizens” (44%, 
versus 27% saying that it provides “good value for money”).101 It should also 
be added that a side-effect of the current ‘opaque’ system is to create 
confusion about the actual volume of the EU budget, which is often 
overemphasised.   
The fear of provoking negative reactions on the part of the public, 
although understandable, is tantamount to admitting that the policies 
financed from the EU budget do not produce sufficiently convincing results 
                                                   
100 See European Commission, “A Budget for Europe 2020”, COM (2011) 500, 
Brussels, 29 June 2011, part I, pp. 8-9, and Council recommendation on the discharge 
to be given to the Commission for the financial year 2012, doc. 5848/14 ADD 1, 
Brussels, 5 February 2014, Introduction, point 4.  
101 See Standard Eurobarometer 75, “Europeans and the European Union budget”, 
May 2011, p. 8 
(http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb75/eb75_budg_en.pdf). 
A
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about their added value. Nevertheless, this cannot be the ground for keeping 
the EU budget financing out of citizens’ sight. The need to convincingly 
demonstrate whether and to what extent the achievements of EU 
expenditure have met the expectations exist, irrespective of the visibility of 
revenue arrangements. Moreover, in the context of the current weak 
accountability performance, a visible fiscal source for the EU budget would 
serve the function of increasing the pressure on the management to 
demonstrate the added value of EU expenditure, thus potentially enhancing 
the public’s trust in the EU’s finances. 
Public support can only be acquired by funding effective policies that 
work to the advantage of the European citizens as a whole. Producing 
tangible results that entail an added value for Europeans could only facilitate 
their acceptance of the corresponding taxation.102 Failing this, the legitimacy 
of the EU budget itself will inevitably be cast into doubt, regardless whether 
it is or not funded by a visible fiscal source. 
Undeniably, as pointed out by the European Parliament, a reform of 
revenue cannot lose sight of the expenditure side of the budget.103 It would 
seem in particular that the following interlinked issues also deserve 
consideration in the framework of the current review of the EU revenue 
system: the legitimacy of EU revenue and the volume of resources 
potentially needed for the EU budget. 
The legitimacy of EU revenue 
The Treaties establish a causality link between, on one side, the Union’s 
competences and the objectives to be attained and, on the other side, the 
financial means necessary to attain these objectives.104 The Treaties further 
                                                   
102 For the Commission’s analysis of the ‘EU added value’ concept see European 
Commission, “The added value of the EU budget”, SEC (2011) 867, Brussels, 29 June 
2011. For a discussion on this issue, see Tarschys (2005) and Cipriani (2007 and 2010). 
103 See European Parliament, Resolution of 29 March 2007 , op. cit., paragraphs 14 
and 34. Also, in its Resolution of 25 March 2009 on the Mid-Term Review of the 2007-
2013 Financial Framework, Parliament pointed out that the reform of revenue and a 
review of expenditure “should be run in parallel with the aim of merging them in a 
global and integrated reform for a new system of EU financing and spending at the 
latest for the MFF starting in 2016/2017”(see paragraph 9). 
104 See Articles 3(6) TEU and 311 TFEU. 
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specify that in areas that do not fall within its exclusive competence, the 
Union’s action is restricted to objectives that member states cannot 
sufficiently achieve by themselves and therefore management at the EU level 
would be the most cost-effective way (criteria of need-for-action or 
subsidiarity principle).105 Finally, in support of the previous condition, “[t]he 
reasons for concluding that a Union objective can be better achieved at Union 
level shall be substantiated by qualitative and, wherever possible, 
quantitative indicators”.106 
In particular, a relevant assessment of performance for a spending 
programme should refer to the usual relationship input output outcome 
impact. The means needed for the implementation of a programme should be 
put in relation to its deliverables, immediate effects and long-term changes 
in society that are attributable to the EU’s action.107 This would require 
designing spending programmes in terms of specific, measurable and 
achievable objectives, expected outcomes and resulting costs. 
A ‘critical mass’ of necessary funds constitutes a crucial factor to 
achieve a precise and identifiable result. It may be observed in this respect 
that the EU budget intervenes in some 40 spending areas. Table 10 below 
lists the nine EU spending programmes that have been allocated by the MFF 
2014-2020 appropriations for more than €1 billion/year on average.  
                                                   
105 See Article 5(3) TEU.  
106 See Article 5 of the Protocol (no 2) on the application of the principles of 
subsidiarity and proportionality. The Financial Regulation No. 966/2012, op. cit., 
establishes a link between ‘value for money’ and the setting of performance 
indicators in such a way that results can be assessed for each activity (see Articles 
30(3) and 38(3)(e)). This information should be provided annually to the European 
Parliament and the Council. 
107 The following definitions are given by the “Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation 
and Results Based Management” (see OECD, Development Assistance Committee, 
Paris, 2002). ‘Inputs’: the financial, human, and material resources used for the 
development intervention. ‘Outputs’: the products, capital goods and services that 
result from a development intervention; changes resulting from the intervention that 
are relevant to the achievement of outcomes may also be included. ‘Outcomes’: the 
likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an intervention’s outputs. 
‘Impacts’: positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced 
by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended. 
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Table 10. MFF 2014-2020 – Main spending programmes (€ million, Commitment 
appropriations, 2011 prices) 
MFF Heading Programme Appropriations Average/year % of MFF 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Economic, social 
and territorial 
cohesion 
Cohesion Policy 325,146 46,449 36.19 
Sustainable 
Growth: Natural 
Resources 
European 
Agricultural 
Guarantee Fund 
(EAGF) — Market 
related expenditure 
and direct payments 
277,851 39,693 30.93 
Sustainable 
Growth: Natural 
Resources 
European 
Agricultural Fund 
for Rural 
Development 
(EAFRD) 
84,936 12,134 9.45 
Competitiveness 
for growth and 
jobs 
Horizon 2020 70,200 10,029 7.81 
Competitiveness 
for growth and 
jobs 
Connecting Europe 
Facility 19,300 2,757 2.15 
Global Europe 
Development 
Cooperation 
Instrument (DCI) 
17,390 2,484 1.94 
Global Europe 
European 
Neighbourhood 
Instrument (ENI) 
13,683 1,955 1.52 
Competitiveness 
for growth and 
jobs 
Education, Training, 
Youth and Sport 
(Erasmus +) 
13,010 1,859 1.45 
Global Europe 
Instrument for Pre-
accession assistance 
(IPA) 
10,380 1,483 1.16 
Total 831,896 118,842 92.60 
Source: Author’s own elaboration from European Commission, DG Budget 
(http://ec.europa.eu/budget/mff/figures/index_en.cfm#documents). Column 5 refers to 
total commitment appropriations less ‘administration’, ‘compensations, ‘other’ and ‘margins’. 
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The bulk of these appropriations is concentrated on Agriculture and 
Cohesion spending.108 The remaining around 30 programmes will share 
among them slightly more than 7% of the MFF resources. For 20 of those 
programmes, yearly funds available vary from €18 million to €185 million. 
This means that if it is often quite difficult to demonstrate the actual impact 
and benefits brought by major spending programmes like ‘Cohesion policy’, 
it will be even more challenging for far smaller programmes to demonstrate 
the actual outcomes and impacts of EU expenditure.109 
EU spending programmes pursue a multiplicity of grand objectives, 
often unrelated to the available funding and with no specific expected 
achievements. Parliament has expressed concern over the fact that the 
present budgetary cycle “tends to add one priority after another without 
taking any political decision as to issues that, given the limited resources 
available from the tax-payer, need to be scaled down in order to give way to 
the most crucial priorities”.110 
There is a risk of separated vertical strategies with limited or no 
synergies among the various strands and, not least, with the difficulty of 
drawing cross-cutting conclusions. Objectives from high-level policy or 
legislative documents are often not sufficiently focused to allow for the 
monitoring of their achievement over time (for example, with milestones). 
There is no reliable system for collecting performance data in order to 
identify and report on results and impacts, as they become available. 
                                                   
108 ‘Cohesion policy’ aggregates different objectives of the 2014-2020 MFF, such as 
Regional convergence (Less developed regions), Competitiveness (More developed 
regions), Transition regions, Territorial cooperation, Youth Employment Initiative 
(specific top-up allocation), Outermost and sparsely populated regions as well as the 
Cohesion fund. 
109 Despite being an EU policy for 40 years and one of the most significant in terms 
of funding, according to polls very few people are informed about EU regional 
support: only slightly over one-third of EU respondents (34%) have heard about EU 
co-financed projects and almost two-thirds (64%) have not heard about any such 
project. See Flash Eurobarometer 384, Citizens’ awareness and perceptions of EU 
Regional Policy, September 2013 (http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/ 
flash/fl_384_sum_en.pdf). 
110 See European Parliament, Resolution of 25 March 2009 on the ABB-ABM method 
as a management tool for allocating budgetary resources, paragraph 13. 
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EU spending programmes are either entitlement programmes, in 
which the beneficiaries only have to meet certain conditions (like direct 
payments to farmers), or ‘input’-based, in which EU disbursements are only 
linked to the ‘eligibility’ of the expenditure incurred. As discussed earlier, 
the MFF is a single ‘package’ where the relationship between national 
contributions and expenditure is based on the ‘net-balances’ approach, first 
as a measure to negotiate the agreement, and afterwards to monitor its 
implementation. Yet, this approach favours “instruments with 
geographically pre-allocated financial envelopes, rather than those with the 
greatest EU added value”.111 As a result, some 70% of the 2014-2020 MFF 
expenditure is directly or de facto pre-allocated on a country basis as part of 
the MFF.112 In turn, ‘geographical’ allocation makes ‘spending’ an implicit 
objective and possibly the main one (Cohesion policy and Rural 
development are typical examples). To the point that the rate of funds 
‘absorption’ plays the rather peculiar role of indicator of a programme’s 
success. As if ‘spending’ was enough to achieving cost-effective and 
sustainable results. 
In this respect, it is sometimes argued that when EU funds are 
associated with national co-financing (for example, in Cohesion policy and 
Rural development), there is a guarantee for effective spending as opposed 
to simple absorption of funds, since member states would take care to avoid 
wasting their own funds. Yet, the implication of a pre-allocation of EU funds 
on a geographical basis is that they ‘must’ be spent within a given timescale; 
otherwise, they will be lost (dictated by the decommitment rule) and most 
likely cause political embarrassment, notably at national level. There is 
therefore an objective incentive to ‘fill’ the national quota with whatever 
projects comply with the eligibility rules.  
The recent introduction of ex-ante conditionalities (such as strategies 
and priority plans, administrative capacity, monitoring mechanisms) for 
Cohesion policy funds is deemed to ensure that at member state level the 
right conditions for spending are in place from the outset, so as to allow an 
effective and efficient achievement of the objectives of the programmes and 
thus results. Yet, the assurance on the adequacy of national systems through 
                                                   
111 See European Commission, Press release MEMO/11/468, 29 June 2011, p. 7. 
112 Reference is made to Agricultural market-related expenditure and direct 
payments, Rural Development, Fisheries and Cohesion. 
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the Commission’s ex-ante conditionalities assessment, which is currently on-
going, will depend very much on the depth of this examination. 
The Commission has indicated that its ambition for the 2014-2020 
programming period “is to spend differently, with more emphasis on results 
and performance”.113 A similar statement was made for the previous MFF, 
with the intention “to maximise the impact of our common policies so that 
we further enhance the added value of every euro spent at European level” 
with a view also to “better assess Community value added”.114 The concept 
of EU added value is precisely the ‘watershed’ between national and EU 
budgets. Their roles are complementary but different. Not every expenditure 
entails an EU added value and the EU budget cannot intervene in all areas. 
In other words, prioritisation is a must. This is why defined needs, clear 
objectives and appropriate monitoring are the necessary corollaries of the 
subsidiarity principle. 
Reporting by the European Commission on EU expenditure 
achievements is foreseen by four main requirements. A first occasion is 
represented by the preparation of the budget for the following year. In this 
context, programmes statements should contain information on the 
achievement of all specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and timed 
objectives previously set for the various activities, as well as new objectives 
measured by indicators.115 After budget implementation, there are three 
further requirements. These refer to i) the report on budgetary and financial 
management, which includes the achievement of the objectives for the year, 
in accordance with the principle of sound financial management;116 ii) the 
annual activity reports of its Directors-General (together with the summary 
                                                   
113 See European Commission, COM (2011) 500 of 29 June 2011, op. cit., part I, p. 9. 
114 See European Commission, “Building our common future: Policy challenges and 
budgetary means of the enlarged Union 2007–13”, COM (2004) 101, Brussels, 26 
February 2004, p. 3 and p. 30. 
115 See Articles 30(3) and 38(3)(e) of the Financial Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 
966/2012, op. cit.  
116 See Article 142 of the Financial Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012, op. cit.,  
and Article 227 of Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1268/2012 of 29 
October 2012 (OJ L 362, 31 December 2012, p. 1).  
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adopted by the Commission);117 and iii) the evaluation report on the Union’s 
finances introduced by the Lisbon Treaty.118 
Due to the weak performance context discussed above, these reporting 
instruments failed so far to provide sufficient, relevant and reliable evidence 
on what the EU’s expenditure has achieved. In particular: 
 The programmes statements of operation expenditure provide 
extensive information on the context where EU funds are allocated 
and, when they exist (such as for Europe 2020), of the overall policy 
targets. Although it is admitted that it is rarely possible to determine 
whether the desired result is a direct consequence of the policy 
intervention, as other factors not under the control of the European 
Commission also influence outcomes. 
 The report on budgetary and financial management is limited in 
practice to the rates of expenditure achieved and contains no 
performance information. 
 While the Commission’s Directors-General annual activity reports 
“shall indicate the results of the operations by reference to the 
objectives set” as well as “the use made of the resources provided”,119 
the information on policy achievements is quite limited, notably in 
case of policies (about 80% of the EU budget) whose day-to-day 
management is ensured by member states’ bodies. The information 
provided in the annual activity reports is either derived from 
member states’ data, whose accuracy and reliability might be 
variable, or it is based on simulations of the cumulative expected 
impact on GDP and employment elaborated by macroeconomic 
models that cannot be considered as evidence for actual results. 
Evaluations also represent a source of information, but they remain 
experts’ studies not endorsed by the Commission. In fact, EU funds 
                                                   
117 See Article 66(9) of Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 966/2012, op. cit. 
118 See Article 318 TFEU. The Commission has so far published four of such reports 
(see COM (2012) 40 of 17 February 2012; COM (2012) 675 of 21 November 2012; COM 
(2013) 461 of 26 June 2013 and COM (2014) 383 of 26 June 2014). It should be noted 
that this new requirement originates from the works of the European Convention 
(2002-2003). This insertion was opposed at that time by the Commission’s 
representatives on feasibility grounds (see http://european-convention.europa.eu/ 
Docs/Treaty/pdf/892/Art%20III%20310%20Barnier%20FR.pdf). 
119 See footnote 117. 
FINANCING THE EU BUDGET | 83 
policy achievements remain outside the scope of Directors-General 
annual activity reports as the Commission considers that they should 
remain fully in line with its financial responsibility for implementing 
the EU budget.120 Hence, these reports focus on funds disbursement, 
on an assessment of member states’ management and control 
systems and on compliance of spending with the eligibility rules. 
 The evaluation reports on the Union’s finances provide some 
indication as to the effectiveness and efficiency of the programmes, 
but they are not conclusive concerning the expected final results or 
impacts achieved by EU funds. For example, almost 60% of the EU 
budget expenditure estimated in 2014 and 2015 is meant to contribute 
to the Europe 2020 strategy, the EU's long-term growth and jobs plan. 
It is not possible, however, to single out the contribution expected by 
each of the programmes (above all Cohesion policy, the most 
important investment vehicle of this strategy) in achieving Europe 
2020 targets.121 The evaluation reports are therefore not suitable for 
their intended use in the discharge procedure whereby Parliament, 
acting on a recommendation from the Council, decides whether to 
give discharge to the Commission for the implementation of the 
budget. In particular, Parliament’s expectation is clarity and 
transparency about “the relation between the key performance 
indicators, their legal/political basis, the amount of expenditure and 
the results achieved”. It recently regretted that “instead of focusing 
on the achievement of the Union's main objectives, the Commission 
provided a range of evaluation summaries covering European Union 
programmes”.122 The last evaluation report on the Union’s finances, 
                                                   
120 See European Commission, COM (2014) 342, Brussels, 11 June 2014, p. 4.  
121 Europe 2020 is based on five EU targets to be met by 2020, measured by ten 
headline indicators. EU and national targets are available in the data tables 
published by Eurostat (see http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/ 
europe_2020_indicators/headline_indicators). For an analysis of the strategy four 
years after its launch see, European Commission, “Taking stock of the Europe 2020 
strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth”, COM (2014) 130 of 19 March 
2014. 
122 See European Parliament, Resolution of 10 May 2011 with observations forming 
an integral part of the Decisions on discharge in respect of the implementation of the 
general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2009, Section III – 
Commission and executive agencies, paragraph 200, and Resolution of 3 April 2014 
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published in June 2014, follows the pattern of the previous ones. 
However, it provides a description of the monitoring, reporting and 
evaluation frameworks for the financial programmes in 2014-2020 as 
well as an outline of which type of information can be expected at 
different points in time. 
In the absence of reliable information on results, the discharge process 
is focused on compliance issues, notably on the estimate of the level of 
irregularities and on the financial measures taken by the Commission to 
mitigate the impact of such irregularities. The use of funds according to 
‘value for money’ principles remains largely outside the scope of this 
procedure, in contrast with the new provisions introduced by the Treaty of 
Lisbon. 
Despite the Commission’s claim that the 2014-2020 programming 
period will ensure more focus on performance, the use of results indicators 
will most likely be rather limited. Not least because of a lack of critical mass 
allowing EU programmes to achieve definite results by themselves. This 
context puts at risk the possibility of demonstrating that EU funds, in line 
with the subsidiarity principle, provide an additional value to that which 
would have been otherwise created by member states’ actions alone, thus 
making a real difference. 
The Commission is currently working on a stronger and more coherent 
framework for monitoring, evaluation and reporting on the performance of 
EU financial programmes for the on-going MFF, with the purpose of 
allowing reporting on performance by March 2015. The Commission admits, 
however, that a “progressive development of a performance culture will take 
several years to come to full effect, partly because new statistical and other 
tools need to be developed”.123 On the success of these initiatives will depend 
the possibility for the Commission to put in place an adequate accountability 
framework, and therefore a critical condition for a full legitimacy of EU 
revenue. 
It should be stressed that progress will not depend in further reporting 
arrangements, but rather in making them more meaningful. This would 
                                                   
with observations forming an integral part of the decision on discharge in respect of 
the implementation of the general budget of the European Union for the financial 
year 2012, Section III – Commission and executive agencies, paragraph 314. 
123 See European Court of Auditors, “Annual Report concerning the financial year 
2012”, Commission’s reply to paragraph 10.1. 
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require the Commission, entrusted by the Treaties to “execute the budget 
and manage programmes”, “on its own responsibility”,124 to take ownership 
for the information reported and therefore to have in place a monitoring 
process aimed at a systematic review of objectives set. This also in view of 
taking corrective actions when needed and when it is still time, being aware 
that a possible ex-post disallowance of EU funding through financial 
corrections will not repair the failure of not having achieved what was 
initially intended.125 Moreover, these measures rarely imply a recovery of 
funds from the beneficiaries, so that they end up most of the time in shifting 
the burden on national budgets, resulting therefore in a further charge on 
taxpayers. 
The ultimate objective should be that just as the Union cannot adopt 
any act likely to have appreciable implications for the budget “without 
providing an assurance that the expenditure arising from such an act is 
capable of being financed within the limit of the Union's own resources” and 
in compliance with the MFF,126 a similar assurance should exist as a pre-
requisite concerning the setting of “specific, measurable, achievable, relevant 
and timed objectives” (SMART), to be monitored by performance 
indicators.127 This assurance should be part of the assessment required by the 
subsidiarity principle to conclude whether the objectives of the action 
envisaged can “be better achieved at Union level”.128 
How much money for the EU budget ? 
Since resources are limited and are needed for many essential purposes, 
there are opportunity costs. The EU and its member states compete for the 
same revenues. As discussed earlier, one of the characteristics of EU actions 
                                                   
124 See Articles 17(1) TEU and 317 TFEU.  
125 I refer in this respect to the distinction between a ‘police patrol’ and ‘fire alarm’ 
approach, in the meaning of active and passive forms of oversight, as discussed in a 
previous study (see Cipriani, 2010, the section “Financial corrections: A shortcut for 
accountability”). The advantage of ‘police patrol’ oversight is that the actor is under 
continuous and direct control, while in a ‘fire alarm’ framework there is less active 
and direct intervention. 
126 See Article 310(4) TFEU. 
127 As required by Article 30(3) of the Financial Regulation No. 966/2012, op. cit. 
128 See Article 5(3) TEU.  
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is to be ‘inevitable’ in view of reaching a better result (criteria of need-for-
action or the subsidiarity principle). The underlying logic is that for every 
EU action, one should be able to answer convincingly the question: Why 
Europe? 
The starting point of any EU action should therefore be a clear 
definition of the nature and scale of the problem and its originating causes. 
This is the role of ‘impact assessments’ undertaken by the European 
Commission to set objectives related to the issues at stake, to identify 
possible policy options (including the ‘no-action’ option) by assessing on a 
comparative basis their potential impact in addressing the problem, and 
finally to specify appropriate monitoring and evaluation arrangements for 
the action proposed.129 
To achieve its specific objectives, the EU has different means at its 
disposal – above all, EU law, which is at the root of a significant (and 
growing) part of national legislation and it is therefore instrumental in 
bringing different national laws in line with each other and effecting changes 
in the member countries’ basic economic, social and political structures. For 
example, it has been observed that the strongest generators of economic 
expansion are most likely to be found in the regulatory sphere. The 
important engines for this development are the internal market, the 
monetary union and the growing mobility of skills and knowledge. In 
stimulating lasting growth, the EU’s rules matter more than the EU’s 
expenditures.130 
To what extent a given EU policy needs EU spending typically requires 
identifying why this may be necessary (as opposed, for instance, to a simple 
regulatory initiative and/or purely national spending). What lessons have 
been learned from previous similar programmes? Are the funds available 
proportionate to such objectives (in particular, will they ensure a critical 
mass)? And, what delivery costs (notably administrative burdens) would be 
entailed? 
                                                   
129 See European Commission, ”Impact assessment guidelines”, SEC (2009) 92, 
Brussels, 15 January 2009. See also European Court of Auditors, Special Report No. 
3/2010, “Impact assessments in the EU institutions: Do they support decision-
making?”, Luxembourg, 2010; and O. Fritsch, C. Radaelli, L. Schrefler and A. Renda, 
“Regulatory quality in the European Commission and the UK: Old questions and 
new findings”, CEPS Working Document, CEPS, Brussels, 26 January 2012. 
130 See Núñez Ferrer (2012).  
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Naturally, the decision whether the expected added value would 
justify EU spending is ultimately the result of a political process. This means 
that the principle of subsidiarity can be considered as a kind of ‘political’ 
ceiling to decide ‘what’ the EU budget should fund and ‘how’.131 In practice, 
however, the expression of such ‘political’ ceiling is translated into a 
‘quantitative’ ceiling, with member states agreeing from the outset an overall 
limit to the resources for the EU budget.132 Hence, the ‘own resources’ ceiling 
represents the main driver of the MFF negotiation, dominated by a 
‘quantitative’ macro-approach at Heading level. Resources are allocated to 
spending programmes as a result of quantitative arbitrage among policies, 
rather than as a result of an assessment of the cost of each programme by 
reference to specific objectives. One example is provided by Cohesion, where 
there is an allocation of funds, but without specific objectives and targets to 
be achieved.  
As shown lastly by the MFF 2014-2020 negotiation, there could be a 
significant difference between the appropriations proposed by the 
Commission and what is ultimately decided. This has been in particular the 
case for the Headings ‘Economic, social and territorial cohesion‘ (-€54 billion, 
or –14%), ‘Security and citizenship’ (-€3 billion, or –17%), and ‘Global 
Europe’ (-€11 billion, or –16%). A ‘quantitative’ approach to EU expenditure 
will objectively encourage making the necessary adjustments for the 
programmes concerned through a simple across-the-board reduction of 
                                                   
131 An early definition of the criteria of need-for-action applied to the EU budget can 
be found in the concept of ‘compulsory’ and ‘non-compulsory’ expenditure. This 
concept goes back to Article 203(4) EEC (as modified by the Treaty of 22 April 1970) 
that referred to “expenditure necessarily resulting from this Treaty or from acts 
adopted in accordance therewith”, other expenditure being considered 
consequently as non-compulsory and therefore discretionary. By way of illustration, 
compulsory expenditure used to cover Agriculture expenditure, Fisheries policy, 
International agreements concluded with third countries, certain compulsory 
staffing costs, legal expenses, damages and the monetary reserve. By contrast, the 
following were classified as non-compulsory expenditure: Structural funds, 
Financial support in the fields of Energy, Industry and Research. Such distinction 
has been removed by the Treaty of Lisbon of 2007. By comparison, only around one-
third of the 2014-20 MFF could be considered as ‘compulsory expenditure’. 
132 For example, similarly to what happened for the previous MFF 2007-2013, five 
member states (France, Germany, Finland, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom) made known to the Commission in December 2010, before the latter was 
due to present its proposal of MFF, their desire to have a ‘real-terms freeze’ on EU 
expenditure after 2013.  
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funding (with the risk of further compounding the current lack of critical 
mass discussed earlier), rather than by re-assessing the objectives of these 
programmes.  
There is actually not such an ‘ideal’ or ‘normal’ size for the EU budget: 
resources equivalent to 1% of EU GNI could be too many, or too few. It all 
depends on the targets set for the different policies that the Union decides to 
pursue. 
One could well understand that EU expenditure cannot run at full 
gallop and that therefore some limits to resources should be set. Yet, 
‘budgetary discipline’ cannot represent an end in itself and certainly not a 
means to guarantee ‘value for money’. This is even less so when most 
programmes continue to be set on the basis of geographically pre-allocated 
financial envelopes, making spending an objective in itself. The question is 
whether limits on expenditure may be set not at macro level but by starting 
from an assessment, at programme level, of the own merits and costs of the 
different policies to be considered for EU funding. In particular, the MFF 
negotiation could take advantage of the outcome of impact assessments 
concerning the lessons of the past, different alternatives and estimated 
costing of the objectives proposed.  
An approach based on establishing first a rationale about what is 
actually intended to be achieved and the costs involved for the expected 
results would prepare the ground for more-effective achievements and 
accountability. Expenditure would be linked from the outset to specific 
objectives and performance indicators, ensuring that it will be possible later 
on to measure the impacts of EU spending. Assessing the potential impact of 
spending programmes would also provide the opportunity to identify 
potential direct and indirect beneficiaries, in view of resolving possible 
budgetary imbalances “by means of expenditure policy” rather than by 
complex correction mechanisms.133 
In such a framework, the overall resources needed by the EU budget 
would naturally be determined by the sum of the costs of these policies, as a 
result of the objectives to be achieved. Should this overall amount appear 
‘excessive’, it would be easier to cut specific objectives of a lower priority 
rather than making indiscriminate across-the-board reductions. Moreover, 
to combine predictability and flexibility, consideration could be given to 
                                                   
133 See footnote 23. 
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allocating to multi-annual programmes amounts ‘deemed necessary’, 
representing an indicative estimate of the budgetary implications with 
possibly minimum and maximum amounts, instead of the current fixed 
financial envelopes.134 
This process could reconcile the legitimate objective of setting some 
expenditure limits with good management of the programmes. In particular, 
it would allow adapting the size of programmes (upwards but also 
downwards) during implementation, for example by the middle of the MFF, 
according to expected results and lessons learned as well as following new 
priorities. As pointed out by Parliament, “it is particularly important that 
allocations of funds are based on objective criteria and on a continuous 
evaluation of their performance”.135 By the way, the idea of a mid-term 
review/revision is already provided for in the 2014-2020 MFF, even if there 
is no expectation that pre-allocated national envelopes will be amended by 
such review. The fluctuation of EU VAT revenue according to economic 
circumstances, as sketched in the section “Making the VAT-resource visible 
to citizens”, would go in the same direction. 
A MFF as the consolidation of an assessment programme by 
programme would be in line with the evolution of the balance of powers 
between Council and Parliament, taking account of the fact that almost all 
EU legislation is to be endorsed by both institutions through the ordinary 
legislative procedure. The process suggested would lead in practice to align 
the powers for approving the MFF with those for approving the spending 
programmes. Such process would also make the annual budgetary 
procedure more meaningful, as opposed to a transposition of the MFF 
annual estimates. This would be a natural development of the extension of 
the co-decision framework for approving the annual budget where 
Parliament is at an equal level with the Council. 
Concluding remarks 
A reform of EU revenue cannot lose sight of the expenditure side of the 
budget. Irrespective of the visibility of its funding source, the basis for 
                                                   
134 The concept of ‘means deemed necessary’ is used for the specific programmes 
developed within each activity of the multiannual Research framework programme 
(see article 182(3) TFEU). 
135 See European Parliament, Resolution of 25 March 2009 on the Mid-Term Review 
of the 2007-2013 Financial Framework, paragraph 16.  
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legitimacy of EU revenue lies in the possibility to convincingly demonstrate 
whether and to what extent EU expenditure has met the expectations and 
produced tangible and positive results for Europeans. It is this 
demonstration that can make citizens accept the corresponding taxation. In 
the current weak accountability context, notably for performance, a visible 
fiscal source for the EU budget has actually the potential to enhance trust in 
the EU’s finances by increasing the pressure to demonstrate the European 
added value of EU expenditure. 
A relevant assessment of performance would require the design of 
spending programmes in terms of specific, measurable and achievable 
objectives, expected outcomes and resulting costs. Yet, EU spending 
programmes pursue a multiplicity of grand objectives, often unrelated to the 
available funding and with no specific expected achievements. Also, EU 
spending programmes are either entitlement programmes where 
beneficiaries only have to meet certain conditions (like direct payments to 
farmers) or ‘input’-based, so EU disbursements are only linked to the 
‘eligibility’ of the expenditure incurred. Moreover, the ‘geographical’ 
allocation of most EU expenditure makes ‘spending’ an implicit objective 
and possibly the main one.  
There is currently no reliable system for collecting performance data in 
order to identify and report on results and impacts, as they become available. 
Due to the absence of a ‘battery indicator’, the Commission’s reporting has 
failed so far to provide sufficient, relevant and reliable evidence on what the 
EU’s expenditure has achieved. Yet, weak information on performance has 
a knock-on effect on the annual discharge procedure, meant to be more than 
a formal act of closing the accounts, focused as it is on compliance issues 
whilst it should offer the political authorities “an opportunity to assess the 
management of the financial resources of the European Union, to propose 
measures for its improvement and to express an overall political judgment 
on its quality”.136 
The ‘own resources’ ceiling represents the main driver of the MFF 
negotiation. Resources are allocated to spending programmes as a result of 
quantitative arbitrage among policy areas, rather than following an 
assessment of the cost of each programme by reference to specific objectives. 
An approach based on establishing first a rationale about what it is actually 
intended to achieve and the costs involved for the expected results would 
                                                   
136 See European Parliament, Resolution of 13 December 2000 on reform of 
budgetary control procedures and institutions, paragraph D. 
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prepare the ground for more effective achievements and accountability. 
Expenditure would be linked from the outset to specific objectives and 
performance indicators, making it possible later on to measure the impacts 
of EU spending and report there upon. 
In such a framework, the overall resources needed by the EU budget 
would naturally be determined by the sum of the costs of these policies, as a 
result of the objectives to be achieved. Moreover, to combine predictability 
and flexibility, consideration could be given to allocating to multi-annual 
programmes amounts ‘deemed necessary’, representing an indicative 
estimate of the budgetary implications with possibly minimum and 
maximum amounts, instead of the current fixed financial envelopes. This 
process would allow adapting the size of programmes (upwards but also 
downwards) during implementation, for example by the middle of the MFF, 
according to expected results and lessons learned as well as in response to 
emerging new priorities. As a result, the importance of the annual budget 
procedure will be enhanced. 
A MFF, as the consolidation of an assessment programme by 
programme, would be in line with the evolution of the balance of powers 
between Council and Parliament, taking account of the broad co-decision 
framework for approving the spending programmes and the annual budget, 
where Parliament is now on an equal level with the Council. 
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